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Abstract: 
The paper explores Derrida's essays "La mythologie blanche" and "Le retrait de la 
métaphore", and offers an interpretation of Derrida's complex analysis of metaphor. 
Metaphor is found to be an elusive entity, who se borders expand. The concepts that 
organize philosophy are metaphorically charged themselves, and this intertwining of 
philosophy and metaphor leads to complex interplay between proper meaning, or 
concept, and metaphoricity. The dynamics of this problematic lead through the texts of 
various other writers, particularly Aristotle, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. The analysis of 
metaphor and its disruptions is found to meet up with différance and Derrida's non-
tradition al perspective on meaning. 
Derrida - metaphor - proper meaning - post-structuralism - deconstruction 
- rhetoric 
Résumé: 
III 
Cet article explore les essaies "La mythologie blanche" et "Le retrait de la métaphore", 
offrant une interprétation de l'analyse complexe de Derrida sur la métaphore. La 
métaphore s'avère être une entité évasive, dont les frontieres s'agrandissent. Les concepts 
qui organisent la philosophie sont marqués par la métaphoricité, mais dûs à 
l'entrelacement de la philosophie et de la métaphore, ceci mène à l'effet complexe entre le 
sens propre, ou le concept, et le métaphoricité. La dynamique de cette problématique est 
dirigée envers les textes de certains autres auteurs: Aristote, Heidegger, et Nietzsche, en 
particulier. L'analyse de la métaphore et de ses ruptures se trouve a relier à la différance 
et à la perspective non-traditionnelle de Derrida sur le question de la signification. 
Derrida - métaphore - sens propre - post-structuralisme - déconstruction 
- rhétorique 
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1) Introduction 
Metaphor has an important place in the work of Jacques Derrida, in more 
than one respect. His texts are rich with metaphorical play, and his work 
displays an extraordinary insightfulness into the complexity of questions of 
metaphor and sensitivity to the difficulties of dealing with metaphor theoretically. 
An investigation into how Derrida addresses the concept of metaphor should 
prove to be rewarding in what it reveals about the subject of metaphor itself, and 
it may also prove to be valuable with respect to the broader stream of Derrida's 
work and the questions of meaning on which so much of his writing is focused. 
ln dealing with these two aspects of Derrida's relationship with metaphor 
- his study of the concept of metaphor and the place of this question in the 
broader scope of his philosophy - 1 hope to shed new light on the nature of 
Derrida's thought. It has been already been noted by various writers, and 
explored at length by sorne, that questions of metaphor are of great importance 
in Derrida's work. This might prompt the question as to whether it is 
worthwhile to retrace sorne of the movements in Derrida's work with a focus on 
questions of metaphor. In this paper 1 will certainly have recourse to sorne of the 
writers who have aIready engaged with this topic; but it is also my hope that this 
exploration of sorne of Derrida's texts with a focus on metaphor will offer a new 
perspective with interesting differences. As many readers of Derrida have noted, 
and as Derrida himself has acknowledged, his texts are challenging and dense, 
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his writing and textual maneuvers are often complex and multilayered, and a 
basic or general comprehension of his texts is not always easily achieved. 
The stylistic modes of Derrida's writing are tightly bound up with the 
philosophical positions that are found in his texts. To a great extent, and 
increasingly in his later texts, the style of his writing plays a central role in 
working out and setting into motion his theory of meaning - that is, if the 
analysis of language and meaning in Derrida's texts can be identified as a theory, 
with all that the tenn might entail; for it is a description that Derrida would 
likely, to sorne extent, resist. Indeed, the question of whether or not and in what 
sense Derrida's work could be construed as developing a theory of meaning is 
one that willloosely guide my investigation of questions of metaphor. 
That the style of writing bears an essential relation with the philosophical 
content is arguably the case with any writer. In the case of Derrida's writing, 
however, there is a particularly striking attention to the diverging possibilities of 
meaning, such that his texts present certain interpretative challenges for the 
reader. These challenges are encountered in the metaphorical play, the 
diffraction into multiple meanings at once (or, to put it in Derrida's tenns, the 
"dissemination" of meaning), the strategic use of syntactical and semantic 
ambivalences and of lexical resemblances, and also in playful neologisms 
(which Derrida calls "neographisms"), such as "différance", that are found in his 
texts. And in combination with these stylistic concems, the philosophical 
movement of much of Derrida' s work on language and meaning has to do with 
affinning this non-singularity of meaning. The diverging possibilities of 
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meaning are shown in his texts to be not merely accidentaI to language, not only 
arising in what are perceived to be marginal cases such as metaphor, but rather 
as a condition that is fundamentaI to language. To show this, Derrida develops a 
position that draws from Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Freud, and their respective 
aUempts to undo or disrupt metaphysical traditions. And particularly important 
in terms of the anaIysis of language and meaning is the fact that Derrida finds an 
important resource in the structuraIist discoveries of Saussure. Derrida caIls for 
a shift of emphasis in the anaIysis of questions of meaning, which would include 
transitions from the semantic to the syntactic; from the essential unity of 
meaning to ifs irreducible division; from the nominal to the "grammatological", 
and others as weIl. But it is also true that Derrida works at undoing the se 
dichotomies as such, showing that both sides of each dichotomy is intertwined, 
and that the traditionaI account of their division is inadequate. Derrida' s account 
of meaning is in sorne respects quite radical, and 1 will pursue its explanation 
here insofar as his view of meaning bears upon the question of metaphor, and 
vice versa. 
It is demonstrated, through both the stylistic approach of Derrida's 
writings and the positions he elaborates, that meaning cannot be completely 
carried, transferred, represented, from one text to another, or even, in fact, from 
one moment to another; for meaning does not have a whole and singular 
existence, complete and present, to be mastered. As this paper will show in 
greater detail, this view of meaning accords with a pivotaI principle in Derrida's 
work: this is the law of différance, a term coined by Derrida which has taken on 
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a prominent role throughout his texts. Différance signifies a principle of 
differentiation that is irreducible, which is effective "prior" to any possible unit y 
of meaning. Thus, to mark in another way the direction 1 will be taking here, 1 
will inquire into how metaphor can be identified, construed, and thought vis-à-
vis the axis of différance. 
In the essay "La mythologie blanche: la métaphore dans le texte 
philosophique", a sustained exploration of questions of metaphor, Derrida 
examines the question of the role of metaphor in philosophy, and its analysis in 
philosophy and rhetoric. "La mythologie blanche" considers a variety of texts 
that deal with the concept of metaphor; these texts, from diverse writers, contain 
important common threads which Derrida attempts to draw out and connect. 
"La mythologie blanche", at least at the outset, is oriented by the following 
question: How can philosophy master metaphor, or even provide a plausible 
account of metaphor, when metaphor appears to be operative in so much of its 
text and in so many of its concepts? 
It is not far into "La mythologie blanche" that Derrida provides a 
provisional answer: 
Au lieu de risquer ici des prolegomènes à quelque métaphorique future, essayons plutôt de 
reconnaître en son principe la condition d'impossibilité d'un tel projet. Sous sa forme la 
plus pauvre, la plus abstraite, la limite serait la suivante: la métaphore reste, par tous ses 
traits essentiels, un philosophème classique, un concept métaphysique. Elle est donc prise 
dans le champ qu'une métaphorologie générale de la philosophie voudrait dominer. Elle est 
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issue d'un réseau de philosophèmes qui correspondent eux-mêmes à des tropes ou à des 
figures et qui en sont contemporains ou systématiquement solidaires. Cette strate de tropes 
"instituteurs", cette couche de "premiers" philosophèmes (à supposer que les guillemets 
soient ici une précaution suffisante) ne se domine pas.1 
While Derrida' s exploration of the question of metaphor here and in other texts 
is extensive, the limit that he articulates here in its "impoverished" and 
"abstract" form is never actually denied. Derrida's discussion of metaphor can 
be understood, in his own words, as an attempt to "reconnaître en son principe la 
condition d'impossibilité d'un tel projet." 2 In short, if the concepts of 
philosophy are "contemporaneous to" or in "systematic solidarity" with a layer 
of tutelary tropes, of primary figures, then metaphoricity, in sorne sense of it at 
least, will always precede philosophy. Philosophy, therefore, has a limit, and 
cannot master metaphor. The question, then, becomes: What are the 
consequences of this limit for metaphor and propriety as such? 
Derrida's work is always at sorne lev el a critical, or "deconstructive", 
engagement with metaphysics; the question of metaphor is one extension of this 
project, and it is safe to assume that the question of metaphor involves the 
question of metaphysics in a significant way. Due to this relation, these 
questions willlead into various of Derrida's texts, not only those that deal most 
explicitly with metaphor; for the problem of the limits of metaphor as Derrida 
1 Marges de la philosophie [hereafter "Marges"], 261. English translations of Derrida's works 
cited in this essay will correspond with the English translations of these works as listed in the 
B ibliography. 
2 Ibid., 261. 
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construes them ultimately corresponds with his overall project of delimiting and 
undermining - "deconstructing" - c1assical metaphysics. And although it may 
also to sorne extent be theoretically separable from this project, the question of 
metaphor fits in an interesting and productive way with other themes in 
Derrida's work. The limits that mark the impossibility of philosophy's 
mastering of metaphor are limits that will prove to bear upon the question of 
metaphysics as well, first and foremost in terms of the metaphysical premises 
that structure theories of language and meaning. 
Along with "La mythologie blanche", the essay "Le retrait de la 
métaphore" also plays a role in this analysis. "Le retrait de la 
métaphore"explores various facets of the inability of philosophy to master 
metaphor. Metaphor's retreat ("retrait") from the grasp of philosophy 
corresponds in multiple ways with the notion of différance, the intrinsic 
disruption of the central suppositions of metaphysics with respect to meaning 
and identity. Through the investigation, in Derrida's texts, of the limits of the 
philosophical concept of metaphor, it is shown that the account of language 
based on tradition al philosophical premises is surprisingly incomplete. "La 
mythologie blanche" and "Le retrait de la métaphore" are dense texts, with 
various elements of Derrida's works brought to bear on a constellation of 
problems. Thus, part of our aim here will be to situate Derrida's writings on 
metaphor within the scope of the rest of his texts, to re-articulate the movements 
in his writings on metaphor by relating them to the larger body of his work and 
to sorne of the concems found therein. 
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"La mythologie blanche" is in part concemed with describing the 
concept of metaphor in its traditional features. However, throughout his texts, 
Derrida insists that multiplicity and division operate~ wherever unit y is 
presupposed; and this would apply to the concept of metaphor as weIl. Thus one 
might hesitate before attempting to identify the concept of metaphor, or the 
metaphysical tradition that encompasses it, as though the y were totalities with 
clear boundaries. Nevertheless, there is an extent to which metaphor as a 
concept can be outlined, by looking at its formulation in texts su ch Aristotle's; 
metaphor is a distinctly philosophical concept, which is dependent upon certain 
philosophical principles. But it can also be shown, by elaborating from the same 
texts, that the concept of metaphor, as it is determined by philosophy, inevitably 
results in a paradoxical relation to philosophicallanguage. By exploring, in "La 
mythologie blanche", the texts of various writers who have addressed the 
question of metaphor, Derrida draws out certain elements that are essential to the 
classical philosophical understanding of metaphor; but in a gesture that recurs 
persistently in Derrida' s work, he also shows that the se elements undermine the 
very philosophical-theoretical structure of metaphor they are supposed to 
establish. This has been suggested already in the idea that due to the 
metaphoricity of the primary terms of philosophy it is impossible to mas ter 
metaphor with philosophy. But this impossibility and its repercussions spread 
out, in Derrida's analysis, and the question becomes much more complex. The 
concept of metaphor is shown to be "self-destructive" - a notion that will be 
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made clearer - but it must be emphasized here that it is the concept of metaphor, 
and not metaphor itself, that will retreat and self-destruct. 1 will proceed to 
review sorne of the principal elements of the traditional philosophical concept of 
metaphor, in order first to work out a sense of what is entailed under the general 
heading of "the concept of metaphor", to tie together what gives it a continuity 
of sorne sort, so that 1 can proceed to explore how Derrida finds the 
philosophical concept of metaphor to be uns table in several ways. In the last 
part of the paper J will be concemed with metaphor's remainder, with the 
possibility that Derrida sees for metaphor as it "exceeds" the tradition al 
metaphysical concept. 
2) The Concept of Metaphor 
The question of metaphor leads back to Aristotle; "TI semble pourtant en 
avoir proposé ItLpremière mise en place systématique, celle qui en tout cas fut 
retenue comme telle. avec les effets historiques les plus puissants." 3 Here is 
Aristotle' s definition from the Poetics, as cited by Derrida: 
"La métaphore (metaphora) est le transport (epiphora) à une chose d'un nom (onomatos) 
qui en désigne une autre (allotriou), transport du genre à l'espèce (apo tou genous epi eidos) 
3 Ibid., 275 
9 
ou de l'espèce au genre (apo tou eidous epi to genos) ou de l'espèce à l'espèce (apo tou 
eidous epi eidos) ou d'après le rapport d'analogie (è kata to analogon)" (1457 b, tr. Budé). 4 
This definition, Derrida observes, is broad and inclusive, encompassing various 
kinds of figurative language, such as metonymy and synecdoche, that would 
later be separated into other categories. Starting with this definition Derrida 
works out the sense in which the concept of metaphor is a metaphysical concept, 
and a "philosopheme"; 1 will briefly retrace sorne of the main points of Derrida's 
discussion of Aristotle in "La mythologie blanche", to outline the "systematic 
situating" of metaphor that is found in Aristotle's texts. 
Because, in Aristotle's definition above, "[m]etaphor consists in giving 
["transport"] the thing a name that belongs to something else", the condition of 
nominalization is essential to the possibility of metaphor, as are the correlated 
principles upon which the theory of the name depends. The name and the 
possibility of naming require a complete and independent signification; what 
Derrida sometimes calls a unit y of meaning ("un unité de sens"s) In Derrida's 
words: "Tout mot qui résiste à cette nominalization demeurerait étranger à la 
métaphore. Or on ne peut nominaliser que ce qui prétend - ou qui dès lors 
prétend - à une signification complete et indépendante, ce qui est intelligible par 
soi-même, hors de toute relation syntaxique.,,6 The notion of a "complete and 
independent signification" is thus a key compone nt in metaphor; and a principle 
4 Ibid., 275. 
5 Ibid., 277. 
6 Ibid., 278 
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of univocity, or monosemism, of "complete and independent signification", will 
be a starting point for the study of metaphor. 
The theory of the name has had an enduring privilege in theories of 
language; and it is essentially bound up with a "chain" of philosophical 
principles. 
Le propre des noms, c'est de signifier quelque chose (Ta de onomata semainei ti. 
Rhétorique III, chap. X, tr. Fr. Garnier, p 349), un étant indépendant, identique à soi, et visé 
comme tel. C'est à ce point que la théorie du nom, telle qu'elle est impliquée par le concept 
de métaphore, s'articule à l'ontologie ... ce qui apparaît ici, c'est une certaine 
indissociabilité de système entre la valeur de métaphore et la chaîne métaphysique tenant 
ensemble les valeurs de discours, de voix, de nom, de signification, de sens, de 
représentation imitative, de ressemblance; ou, ... les valeurs de logos, phonè semantikè, 
semainein, onoma, mimesis, homoiosis.7 
The concept of metaphor is constituted by the philosophical "chain" Derrida 
refers to here, which bears upon the discussion of metaphor wherever it surfaces. 
Indeed, the se philosophical principles that structure metaphor have an influence 
on the western philosophical tradition that can hardly be overestimated. The 
principle of the discrete semantic unit y, the "complete and independent 
signification", is intertwined with ontology and semantics; to take one important 
ex ample of this, the name or nominative word traditionally indicates ideas of 
7 Ibid., 282. 
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object rather than ideas of relation. 8 In order to grasp the determination of 
metaphor as a philosophical concept, the philosophical chain that orients it must 
be taken into account; and through this chain the question of metaphor becomes 
an entry into the problem of the priority of unit y over relation and divisibility. 
In broad strokes, 1 will now sketch out sorne of what Derrida covers in 
his analysis of Aristotle's account of metaphor. Aristotle's discussion of 
metaphor in the Poe tics appears within a discussion of mimesis; mimesis, 
imitation, is thus the function of metaphor, which is a kind of poetic device. 
Mimesis depends upon the notion of likeness, homoiosis. A passage from 
Aristotle, cited by Derrida, states: "'Bien faire des métaphores, c'est bien voir le 
semblable' (to gar eu metapherein to to homoion theorein estin. 1459 a).,,9 
Aristotle repeats this elsewhere, and specifies the incentive for using metaphors: 
"La métaphore, en effet, ne va pas sans procurer une certaine connaissance de la 
chose signifiée (to semainomenon), en raison de la ressemblance (dia ten 
homoioteta) qu'elle établit, car toutes les fois qu'on se sert de la métaphore on le 
fait en vue de quelque ressemblance." 10 Metaphor indicates ressemblances. 
Govemed by homoiosis, mimesis is thoroughly linked with truth, aletheia, as 
such. Derrida writes: "L' homoiosis n'est pas seulement constitutive de la valeur 
de vérité (aletheia) qui commande toute la chaîne, elle est ce sans quoi 
l'opération métaphorique est impossible"ll Thus, for Aristotle, metaphor is an 
8 Ibid., 281. 
9 Ibid., 282. 
10 Ibid., 300-301. 
Il Ibid., 282. 
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operation that participates in the movement of language towards truth. Derrida 
writes (on Aristotle's view): "La mimesis ainsi déterminée appartient au logos ... 
elle est liée à la possibilité du sens et de la vérité dans le discours." And further 
(still on the subject of Aristotle), "le logos, la mimesis, et l'aletheia sont ici une 
seule et même possibilité.,,12 In mimesis, and therefore metaphor, in a relation of 
homioisis, nature, physis, reflects itself in a movement of revelation of truth. In 
Derrida's words: 
La condition de la métaphore (de la bonne et vraie métaphore) est la condition de la vérité. 
n est donc normal que l'animal, privé de logos, de phonè semantikè, de stoikheion, etc., soit 
aussi incapable de mimesis ... Au début de la Poétique, la mimesis est posée en quelque sorte 
comme une possibilité propre à la physis. Celle-ci se révèle dans la mimesis, ou dans la 
poésie qui en est une espèce ... Elle appartient à la physis, ou si l'on préfère, celle-ci 
comprend son extériorité elle-même et son double. La mimesis est donc, en ce sens, un 
mouvement "naturel". Cette naturalité est réduite et confiée par Aristote à la parole de 
l'homme. Plutôt qu'une réduction, ce geste constitutif de la métaphysique et de 
l'humanisme est une détermination téléologique: la naturalité en général se dit, se rassemble, 
se connaît, s'apparaît, se mire et se "mime" par excellence est en vérité dans la nature 
humaine. I3 
Metaphor, as Aristotle views it, is a means to knowledge which is to be arrived 
at through mimesis. And, importantly, "as an effect of mimesis and homoiosis,,14, 
12 Ibid., 283. 
13 Ibid., 283-83. 
14 Ibid., 283. 
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metaphor is essentially analogical. It performs its function best when it 
satisfactorily indicates an analogical relation. In this way, nature, physis, is 
revealed, through a teleological movement of language oriented towards truth. 
This movement is a possibility of logos, which is made present in lexis - which, 
in tum, has as its basis the semantic unity. This brings us back to metaphor, to 
"the element of metaphor", the "first semantic unit y" of the name. 15 
The semantic unit y has been indicated as an element of the concept of 
metaphor. In the fol1owing passage, which Derrida cites in "La mythologie 
blanche", Aristotle proclaims the incontestability of the principle of univocity: 
"TI est d'ailleurs indifférent qu'on attribute plusieurs sens au même mot, si seulement ils 
sont en nombre limité, car à chaque définition pourrait être assigné un mot différent [ ... ] 
Mais si on ne posait pas de limite et qu'on prétendît qu'il y eût une infinité de significations 
il est manifeste qu'il ne pourrait y avoir aucun raisonnement [discourse, définition, logos]. 
En effet, ne pas signifier une chose unique, c'est ne rien signifier du tout, et si les noms ne 
signifiaient rien, on ruinerait tout échange de pensée entre les hom~s, et, en vérité, aussi 
avec soi-même; car on ne peut pas penser si on ne pense pas une chose unique; et, si on le 
peut, un seul nom pourra être assigné à cette chose. Qu'il soit donc entendu, ainsi que nous 
l'avons dit au début, que le nom possède un sens défini et une signification unique. 
(Métaphysique r 1006 a 30 b 15),,16 
Reason, in Aristotle's view, depends absolutely upon univocity, on meaning as 
discrete units. Indeed, reason and univocity seem to be almost indistinguishable. 
15 Ibid., 281. 
16 Ibid., 295. 
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Language, which is a function of logos, is structured on distinct, whole meanings; 
and metaphor would seem to be no exception. Derrida writes, explaining 
Aristotle's theory: "[c]haque fois que la polysémie est irréductible, quand aucune 
unité de sens ne lui est même promise, on est hors de langage ... Le propre de 
l'homme, c'est sans doute de pouvoir faire des métaphors, mais pour vouloir dire 
quelque chose, et seulement une.,,17 Derrida argues that this ideal of univocity 
does not conflict with the fact of polysemy, which is always taken to be 
reducible to monosemy: 
Aristote reconnaît qu'un mot peut avoir plusieurs sens. C'est un fait. Mais ce fait n'a droit 
de langage que dans la mesure où la polysémie est finie, où les différentes significations 
sont en nombre limité et surtout assez distincte, chacun restant une et identifiable. Le 
langage n'est ce qu'il est, langage, que pour autant qu'il peut alors maîtriser et analyser la 
l ,. S 18 po yserrue. ans reste. 
Univocity is taken to be indispensable for language, and necessary for reason 
and for philosophy. On the whole, it is a crucial concept, then, which plays an 
essential role in language as such. To focus in on this, the daim that "not to 
have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning, 
reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself, has been annihilated", 
must come under greater scrutiny. On the one hand, univocity is essential to the 
philosophical concept of metaphor as such, which is built upon the priority of the 
17 Ibid., 296. 
18 Ibid., 295. 
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name and the corresponding unit y of meaning. Univocity is a principle - an 
axiom, even - that Derrida wants to challenge, to disrupt with an alternative 
account which interprets language, and metaphor, beyond the limits of univocity. 
For, ultimately, univocity, singular, present meaning, (to paraphrase Derrida 
writing on a similar theme) is philosophy's impossible dream. 
In spite of the weight it carries, univocity is an uncriticized principle on 
which philosophy relies; and it is a component of a conception of meaning that 
has remained essentially undisturbed since Aristotle's judgment that if meanings 
were not discrete, obviously logos would be impossible. Unitary meanings are 
the building blocks of logos. The irreducibility of univocity is given emphasis in 
the rhetoric of Aristotle's statement. Obviously ("il est manifeste que"), he says, 
any meaning must be one meaning: obvious, as though if it were inseparable 
from the concept of meaning itself. And indeed, meaning is always implicitly 
defined in a way that can be characterized as substantive. In both "natural 
language" and philosophie discourse, meaning is always taken to be reducible to 
single, whole meanings, able to be fully represented and apprehended. 
Univocity is part ofa traditional view of language that is semantic, 
privileging meaning over the signifier, and takes any meaning as such to be 
ultimately singular and whole. The system that constructs the concept of 
metaphor hinges on this major dichotomy: on one side, the signifier, whose role 
is (thought to be) secondary but nonetheless necessary; on the other side, 
meaning, the signified, the content, whose identity is supposed to be in no way 
dependent upon the signifier, the signifier merely presenting it in its plenitude. 
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The unit y of meaning depends upon many other philosophical oppositions as 
weIl; but if "l'opposition du sens (signifié intemporel ou non spatial en tant que 
sens, en tant que contenu) à son signifiant,,19 were not firmly in place, if the Hnes 
between signifier and signified were not quite so clear - and this question plays 
an important role in Derrida's analysis - then the univocity of meaning, in terms 
of the question of metaphor and beyond it, would be severely disrupted. For 
univocity demands units of meaning that are essentially pure, and that are not 
contingent upon any kind of play which would threaten their essential stability. 
The concept of metaphor starts at the axis of the name and the unit y of 
meaning. The principle of univocity, which is articulated in Aristotle, is part of 
the telos of language on which the sem an tic view of language depends; this 
principle bears a constant influence on philosophy and its desire for a full 
revelation of truth as "la vérité comme unité du logos et de la phoné.,,20 Ideally, 
"l'univocité est l'essence, ou mieux, le telos du langage" - and, moreover, "[c]et 
idéal aristotélicien, aucune philosophie, en tant que telle, n'y a jamais renouncé. 
11 est la philosophie." 21 "Dans la vérité, le langage devrait se remplir, 
s'accomplir, s'actualiser jusqu'à s'effacer, sans aucun jeu possible, devant la 
chose (pensée) qui se manifeste proprement." 22 The unit y of meaning 
corresponds with the unit y of things, of objects of thought, presented in language, 
19 Marges, 271. 
20 L'écriture et la différence, 293. 
21 Marges, 295. 
22 Ibid., 288. 
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a possibility of logos. The function of metaphor, as Derrida reads Aristotle, is to 
create a sort of detour in the bringing to light of truth that is normally, or ideally, 
played out in language. Understood as primarily analogical, metaphor is 
described by Aristotle as a means to knowledge; and in fact, there is a sense in 
which it is less immediately but more emphatically a means to knowledge than 
ordinary language, in which the word reveals the thing itself directly; the 
purpose of metaphor is to disc10se true likenesses, and homoiosis is part of its 
necessity. 
There is another si de to this construction of metaphor: metaphor, with its 
element of play, presents a certain risk to the Aristotelian system of language 
and truth. When it cornes to the place of metaphor in the Aristotelian 
philosophical system, a tension presents itself; this tension will prove to be a 
starting point for Derrida's view of metaphor. 
La métaphore n'illustre pas seulement les possibilités générales ainsi décrites. Elle risque 
d'interrompre la plénitude sémantique· à laquelle elle devrait appartenir. Marquant le 
moment du tour ou du détour pendant lequel le sens peut sembler s'aventurer tout seul, délié 
de la chose même que pourtant il vise, de la vérité qui l'accorde à son référent, la métaphore 
ouvre aussi l'errance du sémantique. Le sens d'un nom, au lieu de désigner la chose que le 
nom doit désigner habituellement, se porte ailleurs ... Par sa puissance de déplacement 
métaphorique, la signification sera dans une sorte de disponibilité, entre le non-sens 
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précédant le langage (elle a un sens) et la vérité du langage qui dirait la chose telle qu'elle 
Il A TI est en e e-meme, en acte, proprement. 
The detour that metaphor makes away from truth does not necessarily result 
back at the correspondence of meaning and referent, tied together under the 
name, which is necessary for the revelation of truth. Metaphor does not directly 
say the thing in its truth; and so, at variance with the classical teleology of 
language, it breaks with the correspondence between name, meaning and truth. 
And metaphor can miss the mark; there can be good metaphors and bad 
metaphors.24 It makes a detour that can convey truth, but it is a dangerous route. 
This is a possibility because metaphor disrupts, while making use of, the 
standard mode of semantic referral, the usual relation of meaning to truth which 
is the proper function of language. In the case of metaphor, the meaning of a 
name loses, at least partly or momentarily, its tie to the thing, to its referent, and 
meaning becomes transferable and unsettled. 
Not producing a direct relation to truth, metaphor is something less than 
a full part of language. On the one hand, for Aristotle (in Derrida's words),"[l]a 
métaphore, effet de mimesis et d'homoiosis, manifestation d'analogie, sera donc 
un moyen de connaissance. Subordonné mais certain.,,25 On the other hand, 
however, Aristotle does not altogether trust metaphors; he also criticizes Plato 
23 Ibid., 288. 
24 Ibid., 288. 
25 Ibid., 283-84. 
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for his use of metaphors, describing them as "hollow language,,26; and he says 
that metaphorical expressions are always obscure. 27. In making its detour away 
from proper meaning, with the ideal aim of ending up at the saying of truth, of 
the thing and its analogical relation of likeness, metaphor risks ending up outside 
language, of never escaping the outside of language. And since only 
"nonmeaning" precedes language, the detour of metaphor seems to go through 
this "nonmeaning". If metaphor was not less than a full part of language, a 
poetic device and a marginal operation, then the question of nonmeaning, or of 
something other than the normal correspondence between meaning and truth, 
rnight have to be accounted for within language. The "wandering of the 
semantic" that metaphor creates opens up the possibility of meaning as 
something other than relation to truth; and the opposition between whole, 
present meaning on the one hand and complete absence of meaning on the other, 
seems insufficiently explained in relation to the "wandering of the semantic" 
produced by metaphor. 
The possibility that can be glimpsed here is that metaphor opens up a 
certain deviation within the system of which univocity is a part; and since 
univocity is a vastly important effect of the system of metaphysics, and bears 
much weight as a philosophical principle, the consequences of this could be far-
reaching. 
26 Ibid., 284. 
27 Ibid., 301 
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But this first rift of metaphor from meaning as univocity is still a 
relatively limited one; there are other senses in which metaphor not only 
diverges within the boundaries of semantics and univocity, but actually has a 
decentering effect on the philosophical-theoretical system that determines it. 
Primarily by way of the question of metaphor, it is the concepts of meaning and 
propriety themselves which will come into question, and the disturbance that 
metaphor creates in that system will prove to be more than marginal. As 1 have 
begun to outline, metaphor, in its c1assical concept, is tied to the semantic, 
monosemic system of language, but metaphor will not stay within the bounds of 
the semantic. Furthermore, it will impel a reconsideration of the privileged role 
of the semantic in language, and its limits. Metaphor leads to this surprising 
result in several ways. To put it one way, the analysis of metaphor can be seen 
as an affirmation of the role of the syntactic in meaning - syntactic understood in 
a generalized sense that will be examined further. And this has the potential to 
disrupt the principle of univocity which is essential to tradition al semantics in 
any form, in which meaning can only exist if one thing is meant, in which 
meaning, as such, can only be distinct and whole. The main concem in his 
analysis of the question of metaphor, and throughout the rest of Derrida's texts 
as well, is to affirm the necessary dependence of meaning on systemic and 
structural difference. This necessity, which philosophy has traditionally tried to 
ignore or suppress but which is nonetheless operative within its texts, obstructs 
univocity and ultimately shifts the question of metaphor into a new space. 
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3) The Circularity of the Definition of Metaphor 
In opening, the idea was introduced that the analysis of metaphor in 
philosophy cornes up against a problem of circularity. On the subject of 
Aristotle' s definition of metaphor, Derrida writes: 
Cette définition, la plus explicite sans doute, la plus précise et en tout cas la plus générale, 
pourrait s'analyser selon deux motifs. C'est une thèse philosophique sur~ la métaphore. 
C'est aussi un discours philosophique dont toute la surface est travaillée par une 
, h' 28 metap onque. 
This passage condenses much of what unfolds over the course of "La mythologie 
blanche". Seen in light of this passage, there are, preliminarily, two aspects to 
this essay: 1) The description of this Aristotelian philosophical chain, the 
"system of interpretation" which plays a determining role in the formulation of 
the concept of metaphor by philosophy and rhetoric, and in terms of whiëh the 
concept of metaphor is always a philosophical one. 1 have already begun to 
outline this theme. 2) The description of how this philosophical chain, and the 
concept of metaphor that is determined by it, already presupposes metaphor, 
depends upon metaphor, and cannot precede metaphoricity in order to mas ter it. 
These aspects le ad to a "self-destruction" of the concept of metaphor, to a 
thoroughly disrupted state for the concept of metaphor as such; in this self-
28 Ibid., 275-76. 
22 
destruction1, the concepts of metaphor and proper meaning become much less 
stable and certain. l will turn now to the second aspect; the first aspect will be 
relevant throughout the analysis. 
"La mythologie blanche" examines the work of various writers who have 
sought to reveal the metaphorical "sedimentation" in philosophy. Derrida cites 
Anatole France, Renan, Nietzsche, Freud, and Bergson as having pursued this 
line of analysis. The discussion revolves around the following argument: all the 
abstract terms and concepts of philosophy and metaphysics seem to be 
metaphorical, as the origin of their meanings is in the physical or sensible. The 
concepts of philosophy always seem to carry with them sorne "kernel" of 
sensory data, a basis in the sensible which is forgotten, abstracted away from, or 
worn away (this image of wearing away through metaphor is part of the basis for 
the title "La mythologie blanche"). The example that Derrida examines most 
closely is Anatole France's dialogue The Garden of Epicurus. By means of the 
logic implicit in this text, Derrida tells us, we can see "la configuration de notre 
problème, les conditions théoriques et historiques de son émergence.,,29 In The 
Garden of Epicurus, one of the interlocutors criticizes metaphysicallanguage as 
having lost or "defaced by usage" the origins of meaning in physical experience; 
concepts that once had whole, tangible meanings that were directly connected to 
the world of sensory experience, to reality, lose their meaning and their value in 
being abstracted into metaphysical language. In Derrida's description of this 
29 Ibid., 250. 
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dialogue: "Les deux interlocuteurs commercent précisément sur la figure 
sensible qui s'abrite et qui s'use, jusqu'à paraître inaperçue, dans chaque concept 
métaphysique. Les notions abstraites cachent toujours une figure sensible.,,3o 
Derrida takes a certain distance from France's argument to look at what 
constitutes its possibility. At one level, France's text relies heavily on both the 
philosophical and the metaphorical, and thereby seems undermined on its own 
terms. The problems in managing the question of metaphor in philosophy that 
France's text displays consequently underscores that it remains a significant 
problem. Is there a certain illegitimacy in the fact that apparently metaphorical 
elements of philosophicallanguage are not recognized as such? "La mythologie 
blanche" takes up this problem, and puts into relief sorne of the metaphors with 
which any philosophical text always operates. Indeed, if the existence of a 
"physical origin" in philosophical concepts is an indication of their 
metaphoricity, the occurrences of "metaphorical sedimentation" in philosophy 
become surprisingly ubiquitous. Metaphoricity, broadly understood (following 
Aristotle) abounds in philosophy. 
Not only are figurative, metaphorical expressions abundant (if 
metaphoricity is accepted as an accurate description of them), but even the most 
essential, "grounding" concepts of philosophy seem to be derived from a 
sensible meaning. By virtue of this, their daim to authority rnight seem to be 
shaken. Derrida writes: 
30 Ibid., 250. 
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Les difficultés que nous venons de signaler s'aggravent quand il s'agit des tropes 
"archaïques" qui ont donné aux concepts "fondateurs" (theoria, eidos, logos, etc.) les 
détérrninations d'une langue "naturelle". Et déjà les signes (mots/concepts) dont est faite 
cette proposition, à commencer par ceux de trope et d'arkhè, ont leur charge métaphorique. 
Sont métaphoriques, résistent à toute méta-métaphorique, les valeurs de concept, de 
fondation, de théorie. N'insistons pas sur la métaphore optique ouvrant sous le soleil tout 
point de vue théorique.31 
The problem here is striking; metaphors (if we accept them as su ch) based on 
visibility and vision alone, or what Derrida here calls the "optic metaphor", 
appear to be ubiquitous in philosophy - as he shrewdly puts it, opening up 
"every theoretical viewpoint under the sun .. " Looking back to Aristotle's 
discussion of metaphor, in which he characterizes metaphors as "obscure" and 
"hollow language", it becomes apparent that this analysis has been enmeshed in 
metaphor since it began. For, as Derrida rightfully asks: "Comment une 
connaissance ou un langage pourraient-ils être proprement clairs ou obscurs?" 
"L'appel aux critères de clarté et d'obscurité suffirait à confirmer ... [que] toute 
cette délimitation philosophique de la métaphore se laisse déjà construire et 
travailler par des 'métaphores' .,,32 Philosophy is entangled with metaphor at its 
very foundations; for even in the concepts that organize philosophy, the concepts 
on which philosophy would seem to be "grounded", su ch as theoria (looking, 
viewing), eidos (form), and trope (tum) - not to mention metaphora (carrying) 
31 Ibid., 267. 
32 Ibid., 301. 
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itself - metaphoricity plays a role; and propriety, proper, literal meanint, start to 
seem "groundless". How, then, can philosophy mas ter metaphor? The problem 
seems to be a fairly inescapable circularity. Metaphor is always already active in 
philosophy; philosophy can never contain metaphor, because metaphor, being 
active in the concepts that are used in the defining, always exceeds the definition. 
As stated in the introduction to this paper, there is an extent to which 
Derrida accepts this as a limit, an indication of the impossibility of metaphor. 
Metaphor will not be mastered by philosophy. For one, the critique that seeks to 
uncover the metaphors that philosophy harbors within its concepts, itself 
employs metaphorical expressions, and philosophical distinctions and premises 
in which metaphor is implicated. These analyses do not escape the problem of 
metaphor in philosophy merely by taking it up. It is particularly in this respect 
that Derrida finds France's text to be illustrative of the configuration of the 
problem; for France's analysis rests on numerous philosophical premises, which 
lead to a range of issues that both organize and complicate the question of 
metaphor. Here is a summary Derrida gives of two initial difficulties that 
underlie* France's analysis: 
Il suppose ainsi - motif classique, lieu commun du XVIIIe siècle - qu'une pureté du langage 
sensible a pu avoir cours à l'origine du langage et que l'etymon d'un sens primitif reste 
toujours, quoique recouvert, assignable. [Et] cet étymologisme interprète la dégradation 
comme passage du physique au métaphysique. Il se sert donc d'une opposition toute 
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philosophique, qui a elle aussi son histoire et son histoire métaphorique, pour juger de ce 
que le philosophe ferait, sans le savoir, des métaphores.33 
With respect to these concems, the argument that begins and ends with the 
critique that philosophy is entangled in metaphor seems to be surprisingly 
oblivious to its own entanglement in the problem of metaphor and philosophy. 
While France wants to show that metaphor lurks in every metaphysical concept, 
it is evidently a network of metaphysical oppositions that structures this 
argument, and that constructs the very concept of metaphor that he employs. 
One such opposition is the sensible/intelligible opposition: a conceptual 
distinction which is thoroughly metaphysical. On this subject, Derrida cites 
Heidegger, explaining the latter's distrust of metaphors: "La notion de 
'transposition' et de métaphore (Metapher) repose sur la distinction, pour ne pas 
dire la séparation, du sensible et du non-sensible comme de deux domaines 
subistant chacun pour soi .... Le métaphorique n'existe qu'a l'intérieur des 
f . , dl' h' " 34 rontIeres e a metap ySlque. This connection with Heidegger and 
metaphysics will be pertinent here; however, Derrida stresses that in his own 
view the sensible intelligible opposition is not the only, nor necessarily the most 
important distinction that determÏnes metaphor.35 
Another analysis of metaphor that is relevant here is Nietzsche's, who 
follows a similar line of thought to France's. The most well-known discussion 
33 Marges, 250-51. 
34 Ibid., fn.19, 269 
35 Psyché, 12 
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of metaphor by Nietzsche is found in the 1873 essay, "On Truth and Lies in a 
Nonmoral Sense". In this fiery essay, Nietzsche attacks philosophical 
knowledge, the truth of concepts, and the concept of truth: 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in 
short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, 
canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which 
have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.36 
There is an apparent correspondence here with France's analysis; but Nietzsche 
goes much further, finding metaphor behind not just the metaphysician's lexicon, 
but throughout language, in any daim to "truth". For Nietzsche, the relation of 
conceptual knowledge to the so-called "thing in itself' (the scare quotes are 
Nietzsche's) is nothing more than metaphor, at multiple levels of remove from 
whatever it is we want to grasp. 
The "thing in itself' (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from any of its 
consequences, would be) is likewise something quite incomprehensible to the creator of 
language and something not in the least worth striving for ... To begin with, a nerve 
36 Philosophy and Truth, 84. 
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stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in tum, is imitated in a 
sound: second metaphor.37 
It may be the case that Nietzsche's perspective on metaphor has a 
stronger influence on, or a closer proxirnity to, Derrida's analysis of the problem 
of metaphor than is immediately apparent. France's argument centers on the 
metaphoricity of the fundamental metaphysical concepts; for Nietzsche, 
metaphor is implicated at all levels of language and conceptualization. On the 
face of it, this rnight seem to be a puzzling use of the term "metaphor", and an 
extraordinarily broad one. Metaphor, in Nietzsche's view, is the condition even 
of the transfer of nerve stimulus to "image", and then again of the transfer of 
image to sound. Thus Nietzsche's argument goes much further than France's, 
putting metaphor weIl before the abstract metaphysical concept, and even before 
the word. In effect, it would seem that it is a new sense of metaphor that is being 
put into play. While perhaps not entirely avoiding the problems that complicate 
France's analysis - an apparent recourse to the philosophical principle of 
etymology, in terms of what Derrida calls the "usure" of metaphor, for instance 
- Nietzsche also seems to complicate the boundaries by which his argument 
would be delirnited. For according to Nietzsche, there is no point at which 
human concepts or truths are free of metaphor. A consequence of this wouid 
seem to be that metaphor itself is a metaphor; so in Nietzsche's text the role of 
37 Ibid., 82. 
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metaphor is shifted to a fundamental position, while its identity becomes 
uncertain. 
Whatever the extent to which it stays within or exceeds the framework of 
traditional philosophy, Nietzsche's argument puts metaphor at the root of 
conceptual distinctions, and thereby renders their status uncertain. If the process 
of conceptualization is already metaphorical, then the dislodging of the system 
of metaphysics by metaphor is far more profound than might have been expected. 
By finding metaphor at every step of language and conceptualization, Nietzsche 
seems to fracture the concept of metaphor, sending it throughout language, and 
expanding its borders. While this argument might appear to be, like France's, 
self-defeating, by pushing metaphor to its limits Nietzsche's notion of metaphor 
goes beyond its metaphysical concept, and indeed, beyond the norms of 
metaphysical conceptualization in general. It could be argued that in Derrida's 
analysis of the concept of metaphor he has reformulated Nietzsche's argument 
so that it fits with his own project - namely deconstruction - so that it achieves a 
coherence that might not be evident in Nietzsche's somewhat polemical essay. 
As 1 will show, the similarity between Nietzsche's argument and Derrida's 
analysis begins with metaphor's excess, its being pushed to its limits, to an 
almost paradoxical position. Through this movement, metaphor will come to be 
understood to be effective prior to any supposed non-metaphoricality. That the 
word, the concept, "proper meaning", are aIl first of all metaphorical - or that 
the y are possible only on the condition of metaphoricity - could be the critical 
discovery made by Nietzsche that orients Derrida's analysis. 
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4) Metaphysics as Analogical 
Before exploring further this line of correspondence between Derrida' s 
analysis and Nietzsche's, a detour will be taken here to examine another angle of 
the deconstruction of metaphor. This will involve a different aspect of the 
entanglement of metaphor and metaphysics, an entanglement which affects the 
lirnits of metaphor as a philosophical concept and the complicated nature of the 
relationship of metaphor and philosophy. 
Much of the essay "Le retrait de la métaphore" deals with this other 
sense in which metaphysics and metaphor are intertwined. There is an extent to 
which the problem is based on the texts of Heidegger; but 1 will deal with this 
issue more in terms of what it indicates for Derrida's analysis, and not by 
engaging very closely with Heidegger's texts. The issue, based on an 
interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, is that metaphysics itself involves a 
kind of metaphorical or tropical movement, interpreting Being in terms of 
analogy. Being itself always withdraws, and is never present; instead thereis 
always only the movement of Being as sorne thing (Derrida gives the examples: 
"l'être comme eidos, comme subjectité, comme volonté, comme travail, etc. 38. 
Rodolphe Gasché describes this Heideggerean theme as the "as-structure of the 
understanding of Being." 39 The articulation of Being in language is an 
38 Psyché, 79. 
39 The Tain afthe Mirror, 299. 
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analogical articulation; Gasché explains that, for Aristotle, "whatever is related 
as a certain thing to another, and 'bears to each other the same ratio or relation 
that another pair has' (osa ekei os allo pros alla) is analogical ... it is such an 
equality that Aristotle c1aimed for his categories, and which, along with on and 
ousia, are ... the major senses in which being is said.,,4o And analogy, as 
previously discussed, is essentially linked with metaphor through the association 
of homoiosis and analogy: Derrida observes that, for Aristotle, "[l]'analogie est 
la métaphore par excellence,,41; and that "[l]a métaphore, effet de mimesis et 
d' homoiosis, manifestation de l'analogie, sera donc un moyen de 
connaissance. ,,42 
Metaphysics, naming things in their relations of likeness and 
resemblance, would therefore seem to be in a metaphoric relation with Being. 
And it would seem that Being, not being any thing, cannot be named properly at 
all, i.e., with a meaning that is whole and discrete, corresponding to a referent. 
Le concept dit "métaphysique" de la métaphore appartiendrait à la métaphysique en tant que 
celle-ci correspond ... à un retrait suspensif de l'être, à ce que l'on traduit souvent par retrait, 
réserve, abritement, qu'il s'agisse de Verborgenheit (être-caché), de dissimulation ou de 
voilement (Verhüllung). L'être se retient, se dérobe, se soustrait, se retire (sich entzieht) 
dans ce mouvement de retrait qui est indissociable, selon Heidegger, du mouvement de la 
présence ou de la vérité.43 
40 The Tain of the Mirror, 298. 
41 Marges, 289. 
42 Ibid., 283. 
43 Psyché, 79. 
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Heidegger looks at Aristotle's ontology, and by extension at metaphysics itself, 
as involving a semi-metaphorical or tropical movement. Being itself is always 
"in withdrawal", and it is only Being as such and such a thing that is manifested, 
and articulated by metaphysics. In this sense, it is the withdrawal of Being that 
creates the conditions for metaphor, a kind of "originary metaphor" wherein the 
proper meaning of Being withdraws, leaving only non-propriety, or a kind of 
metaphoricity: 
Se retirant en se montrant ou se déterminant comme ou sous ce mode d'être (partxemPle 
comme eidos, selon l'écart ou l'opposition visible/invisible qui construit l'eidos 
e ... 
platonicien), qu'il se détermine donc en tant qu' ontôs on sous la forme d l'eidos ou sous 
toute autre forme, il se soumet déjà, autrement dit, pour ainsi dire, sozusagen, so to speak, à 
un déplacement métaphorico-métonymique .... On serait alors tenté de dire: le métaphysique, 
qui correspond en son discours au retrait de l'être, tend à rassembler, dans la ressemblance, 
s 
tous ses écarts métonymique en une grande métaphore de l'être ou de la vérité de l'être. Ce 
rassemblement serait la langue de la metaphysique.44 
As Gasché puts it in his discussion of the problem: "all metaphysics, insofar as it 
is concerned with the unit y in difference, must understand itself primarily as a 
philosophy of analogy." (The Tain of the Mirror, 296)45 Metaphysics is itself 
metaphorical, in a generalized sense ("quasi"), with respect to Being; but as 
44 Psyché, 79. 
45 The Tain of the Mirror, 296. 
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outlined, metaphysics, which is "lui-même quasi métaphorique au regard de 
l'être" (Psyché, 80)46, also produce~ the concept of metaphor with which we are 
. attempting to characterize metaphysics. Metaphor, then, produced by 
metaphysics, is a philosophical concept "qui n'a de sens, lui-même, que 
strictement métaphorique.,,47 
But describing metaphysics as metaphorical is an impossibility, because 
the concept of metaphor is itself a metaphysical concept. As outlined above, 
metaphor is thoroughly constructed by a "philosophical chain" su ch as that 
which can be shown in Aristotle's texts. Its function in the organization of 
language corresponds with the revealing of truth, with the notion of meaning 
which can be "transported", and therefore the strict distinction between signifier 
and signified - all distinctly philosophical prernises, which justify Derrida's 
statement that metaphor is a "philosopheme". So the question of Being, as 
Heidegger addresses it, in fact becornes a paradigmatic case of what Derrida 
calls "the abyss of metaphor", and reveals a doubling of metaphor that deeply 
complicates the problem of its identity. 
with a quasi-metaphorical metaphysics producing the concept of 
metaphor, a doubling up of metaphor occurs, a sense in which the question of 
metaphor leads to what Derrida calls an "abyss", or to a kind of metaphoricity 
that cannot be satisfactorily enclosed in the parameters of the classical concept 
46 Psyché, 80. 
47 Ibid., 80. 
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of metaphor. Metaphor,hs itself "strictly metaphorical"; and so, at least in terms 
l' 
of the parameters of its traditional concept, it is rendered obscure and uncertain. 
This intertwining of metaphor, analogy, and metaphysics is the terrain 
that "Le retrait de, la métaphore" attempts to navigate; and the "abyss" of 
metaphor goes very deep. But before moving on to look further at "Le retrait de 
la métaphore", the focus on the question of metaphor here must be broadened to 
include the notion of différance from other texts of Derrida's. In différance and 
several of the important themes that relate to it, "La mythologie blanche" and 
"Le retrait de la métaphore" will find a valu able supplement, and this will help 
situate metaphor in the broader spectrum of Derrida' s writings. 
5) Différance, Writing, and the Trace 
The notion of différance might be the most prominent notion in Derrida' s 
work. It is based on the principle that language operates through the effects of 
the play of differences. Derrida draws this principle primarily from Saussure, 
who agued that all aspects of the sign, which comprises the signifier and the 
signified (or the meaning), is constituted by its difference from other signs. It is 
the differences in any code or system that define the terms, and only the 
differences. The following passage is from Saussure, cited by Derrida, and it 
presents this critical discovery: 
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"Si la partie conceptuelle de la valeur est constituée uniquement par des rapports et des 
différences avec les autres termes de la langue, on peut en dire autant de la partie 
matérielle ... Tout ce qui précède revient à dire que dans la langue il n'y a que des 
différences. Bien plus ... dans la langue il n'y a que des différences sans termes positifs. 
s Qu'on prenne le signifié ou le signifiant, la langue ne comporte ni de idées ni des sons qui 
préexistaient au système linguistique, mais seulement des différences conceptuelles ou des 
différences phoniques issues de ce système. Ce qu'il y a d'idée ou de matière dans un signe 
importe moins que ce qu'il y a autour de lui dans les autres signes.,,48 
In language there are only differences without positive tenns; neither meaning 
(concept, signified) nor signifier (what Saussure, caBs "la partie materieBe") can 
precede difference; no unit y can precede the play of differences that is the basis 
the movement of (in Derrida's words) "la langue, ou tout code, tout système de 
renvois en général,,49. This will be the basis for the principle Derrida develops 
as différance. Difference is a structural necessity that precedes any kind of 
content or identity, whether it is of the signifier, or meaning, thought, or concept. 
Let us consider a demonstration of the thrust of Saussure's argument, 
taking as an example the letter 'a'. What makes this mark identifiable and 
distinct from the other characters in language - is it sorne set of features that 
could be described and listed? The second part of the question can be answered 
only in the negative, for how could aB the endless possibilities of variations on 
that particular letter be accounted for? From the innumerable varieties of 
48 Marges, Il. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
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typeface to the most disparate appearances in cursive writing, no list could be 
exhaustive; there is no set of properties that would finaIly define what constitutes 
the conditions of its appearance. In addition to the impossibility of describing aIl 
the instances that aIready exist, new instances of inscription with new 
differences would endlessly frustrate the project. The conclusion can only be 
aIong the lines of Saussure's: the word, the letter, the grapheme is constituted by 
not being any other; it is constituted by its difference within a system. What 
might be more surprising, but no less justifiable, is that, as Saussure argues, this 
is equaIly true for any component of language, including the idea, the content, or 
meaning. 
In Derrida's view, however, Saussure's definition of the sign, which 
figures largely in his theory, depends upon certain traditional oppositions which 
are uncriticized and aIigned with metaphysics. These oppositions start with the 
dichotomy that articulates the sign as signifier and signified, which inevitably 
draws on the distinction of sensible/intelligible, the privilege of the spoken or the 
phonè over the written, and other corresponding oppositions. In Derrida's 
anaIysis, Saussure moves towards overcoming this distinction, but faIls short of 
doing so. It is with respect to this issue, among others, that Derrida caIls for the 
transformation of Saussure's semiology, which is constructed as a theory of "the 
sign", into what Derrida caIls a "grammatology": "celle-ci opérant un travail 
critique sur tout ce qui, dans la sémiologie et jusque dans son concept matriciel -
le signe - retenait des présupposés métaphysiques incompatibles avec le motif 
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de la différance."so A grammatology would be something like a science of 
writing or of the mark; these terms will come up again in this analysis, for 
through them the principle of difference is put into play. In order to move 
beyond the metaphysical suppositions that are woven into Saussure's account, 
then, Derrida takes up the principle of difference discovered by Saussure and 
articulates it as différance, through su ch motifs as writing and the mark, so that it 
reaches beyond these oppositions and takes on a broader significance. 
'Différance' is a neologism that combines difference and deferral: non-
unit y with respect to identity, and non-presence with respect to the present. In 
language, différance is the movement of difference and relation that is more 
"fundamental" (a concept which Derrida uses only with qualification) than 
identity. In the following passage Derrida outlines it in a relatively concise 
formulation: 
Le jeu des différences suppose en effet des synthèses et des renvois qui interdisent qu'à 
aucun moment, en aucun sens, un élément simple soit présent en lui-même et ne renvoie 
qu'à lui-même. Que ce soit dans l'ordre du discours parlé ou du discours écrit, aucun 
élément ne peut fonctionner comme signe sans renvoyer à un autre élément qui lui-même 
n'est pas simplement présent. Cet enchaÎnement~t que chaque "élément" phonème ou 
graphème se constitue à partir de la trace en lui des autres éléments de la chaîne ou du 
système .... Rien, ni dans les éléments ni dans le système, n'est nulle part ni jamais 
simplement présent ou absent. (Positions, 3811 
50 Marges, 16. 
51 Positions, 38. 
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This principle of différance is the basis for a profound disruption of the 
philosophical view of language, of the semantic view which rests on monosemy 
and univocity, on whole, discrete elements of meaning. The statement bears 
repeating, in order not to underestimate its magnitude: any "element" - and it is 
significant that Derrida puts 'element' in scare quotes - is "constituted on the 
basis of the traces within it of other elements of the chain or system." It would 
be difficult to imagine that this insight is compatible with the tradition al 
semantic view of the essential unit of meaning in any straightforward way. A 
word, or a sign, is constituted, as Saussure claimed, not by being a simple, intact 
element, but rather only by virtue of its relation to what it is not; it is defined in 
terms of its relation to the other signs in the system and by its difference from 
them. Therefore, the fact of division and incompleteness takes priority over 
wholeness and presence. 
The effects of Saussure's princip le of difference can be felt throughout 
Derrida's texts. The shi ft in which difference is transformed into différance is 
brought about by Derrida's merging of Saussure's conclusions with an 
interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of ontological difference. Différance and 
the various figures related to it form a critical response to what Derrida, 
borrowing from Heidegger's analysis, describes as presence. To a great extent, 
the problem of presence as it appears in Derrida's texts can be understood as an 
extension of Heidegger' s critique of this notion as a dominant presupposition in 
philosophy. Heidegger takes aim at the "vulgar" conception of time which 
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privileges the present (the now and the existing) in an uncriticized and 
continually recurring gesture. Derrida's general project is very similar to 
Heidegger's in this respect: through its various motifs, which inc1ude the trace, 
the trait, and writing, différance is aimed to deconstruct the uncriticized notion 
of presence that interprets Being in terms of identity and unit y rather than in 
terms of difference and change. In this way Derrida expands what is elaborated 
primarily as a structural and linguistic analysis by Saussure, in order to take 
advantage of the pressure that the princip le of différance is able to put upon 
philosophy and metaphysics. "[1]1 n'y a pas de présence avant la différence 
sémiologique et hors d'elle"; it is the movement according to which language, or 
any code, is constituted "'historiquement' comme tissu de différences."s2 The 
movement of différance thus divides the present; and "presence" here refers to 
both temporality and identity. Difference, or différance, (the latter being an 
expansion and a quasi-formalization of the former) is in part the deferral of 
completion, and wholeness, of totality and presence. If any element of language 
cannot be unified and constituted except insofar as its unit y depends upon a prior, 
more "fundamental" division and state of relation, then the element is never full 
and present in terms of what is demanded of it, as the name, the word, the unit of 
meaning, by the tradition of semantics. 
Another basis for the fact of différance is repetition, or iteration. Any 
"signifier" (bearing in mind that there has been a disruption of the traditional 
conception of the sign), or any element of language, must bear the possibility of 
52 Marges, 12-13. 
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its own repetition; this makes it identifiable, recognizable, allowing something 
like a continuity of signification. But the very fact of this repetition and 
iterability implies an essential différance, a differing and a deferring of totality 
or plenitude. Each utterance or inscription of a sign, and the possibility that 
always exists of yet another instance of inscription, has the result that the 
meaning of the sign in the traditional sense of meaning, which is, the full, 
complete, present meaning is never totally achieved. There is always the 
possibility of a new context of inscription, a new relation to the other signs in the 
system, and therefore a new differentially constituted meaning. In understanding 
this we have recourse, again, to the roots of Derrida' s notion of différance in 
Saussure's principle of difference. If the full implications of the fact that 
signification is the play of differences in a field are taken into account, then it 
can only be the case that - since the field is ne ver saturated, and another 
inscription is always possible, with a new set of structural differences and 
relations - signification does not stay still. It dîffers even from "itself'; its 
meaning, the fullness and presence of its meaning, is always deferred. 
A striking outcome of différance is the reduction of meaning construed 
as pure interiority. The "exterior" of language (i.e., the marking of the sign, the 
signifier: what Saussure calls the material side of language) is traditionally 
treated as one part of a dichotomy: the subordinate, inferior part, merely carrying 
out the task of signifying the "inside" (the content, the meaning, etc). But the 
content, the "inside" of language, just as in the case of the "exterior", can only 
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be thought in terms of a "fabric" of differences. When the logic of différance is 
followed to its fullest extent, the mark (or other similar terms) ends up being the 
most irreducible element in language, the only basis on which all aspects of 
language can be accounted for. If difference is that which determines an element, 
then ultimately this can only be explained by way of sorne marking of difference; 
without the marking of difference, as Saussure's analysis showed, there is no 
constitution of identity. What disrupts whole, singular identity is difference as 
traces of difference: describable through structures like writing, marking, and 
textual relation. This difference cannot be circumvented; and it applies equally 
to signifier and signified. For if it is the case that it is through a relation of 
difference that an element is determined, there being no whole, present elements 
outside of difference, then the inside, the content, can only be established in the 
same terms as the outside; the "inside" is thereby effectively reduced to the 
"outside" . 
Saussure's analysis, in Derrida's view, established this reduction, having 
marked, "contre la tradition, que le signifié était inséparable du signifiant, que le 
~ignifié et le signifiant sont les deux faces d'une seule et même production.,,53 
. This theme is given great emphasis, and it is an especially radical and 
consequential aspect of the theory of différance. For when difference in every 
instance precedes identity, the theoretical structure of a pure content, a pure 
expression which the signifier merely has the task of representing, becomes 
impracticable. Thus, through an analysis of language following the logic of 
53 Positions, 28. 
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difference, the foundations of the classical conception of meaning are disrupted. 
In Derrida's analysis, only "exteriority" survives the collapse of this distinction, 
although this sense of exteriority would be a transformed one. Because nothing 
precedes the play of differences in language through marking, writing, or 
inscription, the "content" cannot be determined in a position that is not 
intertwined with the signifier and the relations of difference that determine it; for 
both signifier and signified are constituted by the same process, the process of 
marking, writing, inscription, of textuality. The ideality of meaning in its 
traditional form, which is inevitably conceived in terms of univocity, does not 
find harmony with the production of signification that différance describes. In 
Derrida's words: 
cet effet de différance qu'est la structure d'opposition simple dedans-dehors et cet effet du 
langage qui le pousse à se représenter lui-même comme re-présentation ex-pressible, 
traduction au dehors de ce qui était constitué au-dedans .... Dans la mesure où il y a déjà un 
texte, un réseau de renvois textuels à d'autres textes, une transformation textuelle dans 
laquelle chaque "terme" prétendument "simple" est marqué par la trace d'un autre, 
l'intériorité présumée du sens est déjà hors de soi.54 
Thus, différance is irreconcilable with "logocentrism". This is Derrida's word to 
name the most general set of premises and presuppositions of Western 
metaphysics. "Logocentrism", in a few words, is the view that takes logos, or 
S4 Ibid., 45-46. 
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reason, to be superior and fundamental to all other aspects of language; it fonns 
the teleological account of language that sees truth, "de la verité comme unité du 
logos et de la phonè"ss. The counterpart to the privileging of logos and its sole 
possibility in the human voice and the phonè, is the subordination of the signifier, 
writing, exteriority - and of difference, which can only be thought in the se tenns. 
Derrida puts this irreducible marking, this irreducible exteriority, under 
the heading of writing/"archi-writing", or text. This is a notion of writing that 
goes beyond the traditional, narrow sense of writing as the inscribing of words 
(but inc1udes it, just as generalized text and the generalized mark inc1ude the 
narrow senses of those words), to signify the marking producing differentiation 
that is prior to any identity. Writing is the fonnal basis for différance, or 
something like a structure; it is, "comme la possibilité commune à tous les 
systèmes de signification, l'instance de la trace instituée."S6 And 9~ause 
difference as su ch cannot be reduced to the system of presence, it exists only as 
traces. The signifying mark is always a mark of relation; as shown in 
Saussure's fonnulation, signification is not an instance of the presentation of a 
positive value, but the marking of a relation to the rest of the system. Therefore, 
"[l]a différence n'étant jamais en elle-même, et par définition, une plénitude 
sensible, sa nécessité contredit l'allégation d'une essence naturellement 
phonique de la langue."s7 As a marking of difference, it cannot be present, 
because difference is not substantial or whole in and of itself; and so its 
55 L'écriture et la différence, 293. 
56 De la grammatologie, 68. 
57 Ibid., 77. 
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existence takes the form of the trace of difference. But if it is not present, 
neither is it absent; absence, Derrida notes, is merely the other part of the binary 
present/absent: and différance is the very condition for such a binary opposition. 
But this last daim - that différance is the condition for the binary 
opposition present/absent - pushes the problematic of différance and trace even 
further. Différance, through its various forms (of which this is a rapid sketch, 
leaving out various aspects and articulations of différance), constitutes the 
possibility of the conceptual distinctions such as signifiedlsignifier, the 
conceptual distinctions that organize language and philosophy. The trace does 
not just distinguish signs and meanings in a linguistic or similar code: "La trace 
est la différance qui ouvre l'apparaître et la signification." "La différance est 
donc la formation de la forme. Mais elle est d'autre part l'être-imprimé de 
l'empreinte.,,58 So on the one hand, différance reduces all aspects of language to 
a kind of exteriority (as writing, marking, the trace); but on the other hand, these 
forms of différance make such oppositions as present/absent, possible. 
Thus différance, as a philosophical principle of sorts, is in a unique 
position. AlI possibilities depend upon it; through the trace, "elle fonde 
l'opposition métaphysique entre le sensible et l'intelligible, puis entre signifiant 
et signifié, expression et contenu, etc.,,59. But it also disrupts all that it wou Id 
make possible: "La différance produit ce qu'elle interdit, rend possible cela 
58 De la grammatologie, 95, 92. 
59 Ibid., 206. 
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même qu'elle rend impossible.,,6o It is evident that these various themes relate to 
each other; but the question of how and to what extent their collective functions 
and effects can be systematized is not a simple problem. Although the notions 
that articulate différance are not identical, the y are c10sely intertwined. Derrida 
de scribes this as: 
la chaîne dans laquelle la "différance" se laisse soumettre à un certain nombre de 
substitutions non synonymiques, selon la nécessité du contexte, ... la "réserve", à l'''archi-
écriture", à l'''archi-trace'', à l'''espacement'' ... à la marge-marque-marche, etc. 61 
Does this "chain" of concepts constitute the origins of language? Not exactly; 
the y are "archi-concepts", but the y are not origins (arkhè) in the normal sense, 
because they are non-singular, and cannot be unified. They are the forms of 
difference "itself'; and due to the necessity of différance, they are more 
originary than origins (la trace est "l'origine de l'origine"). 62 AlI 
conceptualization or language formation occurs on their basis; but writing is the 
marking of a divided origin, of difference as starting "line". When Derrida 
writes of "archi-writing" or "archi-trace", it is Dot the case that these are simply 
"originary" concepts, the origins of meaning and language: it is an ambivalent 
60 Ibid., 206. 
61 Marges, 13. 
62 De la grammatologie, 90. 
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gesture which is meant both to include the concept of origin, and to put it under 
"erasure" ("rature,,).63 
The concept of origin, arkhè, is an integral part of the philosophical chain 
of presence that 1 have begun to investigate, and it is a crucial question for 
différance. Not only writing and the trace, but all of the themes which have been 
encountered thus far that articulate différance have the effect of complicating the 
concept of origins, a concept which corresponds with the teleology of meaning 
as discussed in relation to Aristotle. The sense in which the se notions are not 
origins per se, but are originary, might remain somewhat obscure at this point in 
the analysis. But the question is entirely relevant to the problem of metaphor. 
Along with the distinctions of signifier/signified, metaphor is constructed by the 
notion of origin, the origin which establishes propriety - though this in turn 
depends upon the separation of signifier/signified, for the proper origin is a 
possibility based on the continuity of meaning. What is metaphor if not a 
displacement of a meaning, via a dis placement of the name, from its proper 
origins? 
These components - including but not limited to the trace, inscription, 
mark, writing, and différance - form the basis for an account of language and 
meaning that is radically different from the account based on Aristotle that was 
outlined above. Ultimately, différance might make the traditional account of 
language impossible - or at least, reveal it to be incomplete. The various terms 
63 Ibid., 90. 
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that are at play here are essentially modes or articulations of différance; more 
specifically, the y are modes of différance as writing. Translator Alan Bass 
writes in a foot note that "[a]ll these terms refer to writing and inscribe différance 
within themselves, as Derrida says, according to the context.,,64 This is a sound 
description of the structure of this chain. By arranging all the se concepts - the 
trace, the trait, the mark, etc. - under the heading of writing, and qualifying their 
respective functions as effects of différance, a fairly effective framework takes 
shape within which the array of concepts that Derrida puts into circulation can 
be organized. This organization is supported by Derrida' s famous statement: "Il 
n 'y a pas de hors-texte".65 Once again, this is a broadened sense of "text"; and it 
could equally be said that everything is writing, or "archi-writing": as "unit y" 
marked by alterity. What each of the se notions has in common is that what they 
illustrate division and non-simpÙcity; they bring about, as effects, words, 
meanings, and concepts, which arise out of non-singularity and are constituted 
by markings, traces of difference. "TI n'y a pas de hors-texte" means that there is 
nothing before or beyond the textual play of differences that operates through 
writing and the mark. 
Writing is a general term under which we can put the mark and the 
incision; and the trace is the mode in which différance has its effects. Language 
in any form (including speech) is always already writing - or, text. It is writing, 
or text, in the sense that it works from traces of différance. Différance is never 
64 Margins of Philosophy, 12. 
65 De la grammatologie, 227. 
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present, as simple and full identity in the "plenitude of its being"; and these 
articulations of différance would be originary, but for the sense that they are 
marks of division and relation, which prec1udes their being qualified as origins. 
With any given elements, différance emphasizes the "between" of them over the 
Ullity of each. The trace of difference belongs to neither one nor the other, but 
rather is the relation of their othemess. "La trace est en effet l'origine absolue 
du sens en général. Ce qui revient à dire, encore une fois, qu'il n 'y a pas 
d'origine absolue du sens en général. La trace est la différance qui ouvre 
l'apparaître et la signification.,,66 
But in the context of différance, what becomes of proper meaning, or 
meaning generally? Derrida writes: "il faut poser la question du sens et de son 
origine dans la différence. Tel est le lieu d'une problématique de la trace.,,67 
The complicated originality of différance and its relation to metaphor will guide 
the remainder of this analysis, as it inquires into where the deconstruction of 
metaphor leads. 
66 De la grammatologie, 95. 
67 Ibid., 102. 
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6) Le retrait 
Retuming to the subject of metaphor: so far this investigation has shown 
metaphor to be "quasi-metaphorical" itself; due to its unavoidable circularity, it 
"withdraws" from the propriety of its concept, no longer being properly named. 
Its effects operate ev en upon the terms 'proper', 'concept', and 'metaphor'; but 
by virtue of the se very terms, it has been produced and defined by metaphysics. 
And in Heidegger's analysis, metaphor has been produced through the 
metaphorical movement of metaphysics. If 'metaphor' does not name a proper 
meaning, then metaphor itself is (though problematically) metaphorical. In its 
excess, "la métaphoricité ne se laisse plus contenir dans son concept dit 
'métaphysique' .,,68 So what becomes of "metaphor", if it is not rendered totally 
enigmatic? To manage the result of metaphor's withdrawal, the exceeding of its 
classical metaphysical concept, the "figure" of the retrait indicates a sense of 
metaphor that is related to the "self-destructions" that have been encountered, 
producing a transformed sense of metaphor that reaches beyond the 
metaphysical concept. 
As Nietzsche indicates, metaphor pervades language, marking every 
concept. In "Le retrait de la métaphore", Derrida links up this idea with 
Heidegger and the question of the analogy of Being. Through the notion of the 
"retraif' of metaphor, a relationship between metaphor and différance is 
established, hinging on the trace; both the withdrawal of metaphor and its 
68 Psyché, 82. 
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marking function are brought together here, and will be shown to run parallel to 
the effects of différance. But this is not to say that Derrida' s analysis of 
metaphor is simply derivative of the theory of différance. Instead, metaphor 
seems to be one particular problem that leads to différance. 
Metaphor marks, and re-marks supplementarily, every text, every 
statement, in "naturallanguage" or "philosophicallanguage", with metaphoricity, 
establishing a circularity, a metaphorical feedback-loop, creating the 
impossibility of a meta-metaphorics, of a total account or containment of 
metaphor. The various aspects of this movement are gathered under the motif of 
the retrait. The multiple possibilities of meaning in the word retrait - the 
movement of withdrawal, as the withdrawal (i.e. impossibility) of the concept of ' 
metaphor itself suggested by the literal meaning, and that which the word 
signifies in its parts, as re-trait - illustrate the range of dynamics that arise in 
struggling with the question of metaphor in philosophy. In its parts, re-trait, 
Derrida describes at once the marking (trait) of metaphor which is a 
supplementary marking (re-trait); and the "withdrawal" - i.e., non-presence, 
non-identity, etc. - of this marking, as weIl. 
The marking trait indicates the inscription or the quality of metaphoricity; 
but it is a mark which is both "supplementary" and elusive, as indicated by the 
"re" (as in both senses: "back" and "again"). One sense in which this is a 
supplementary marking stems from metaphor reaching beyond the concept 
which is supposed to hold it, and charging that which tries to con tain it: at sorne 
level, any attempt at circumscribing metaphor requires metaphor in the defining, 
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and thus there is always a surplus of metaphor that marks the definition with 
another trait. And at the same time, as "La mythologie blanche" illustrated, 
metaphor also withdraws, spreads its reach and cannot be circumscribed; 
exceeding its definition, it performs a retrait in the more literal sense of the word, 
a "withdrawal". The other sense of re-trait, the withdrawal of the mark, as mark 
of metaphor, remains to be "properly" understood. In this aspect of re-trait, the 
mark effaces itself, and withdraws, leaving a marking that is not present. Thus, 
the retrait encompasses and connects different aspects of what Derrida also calls 
the generalization of metaphor, and the dimensions of the word retrait start to 
double up on each other. Metaphor appears at once more effective than ever, 
and less distinct. The retrait, in these senses (which are metaphorically charged 
themselves), indicates the difficulties metaphor presents for philosophy that 
attempts to control it; and the y also point to a constructive outcome, a possibility 
for metaphor other than its containment by philosophy (an impossibility). But 
the se aspects of the movement of metaphor, and particularly its marking, remain 
somewhat obscure. Metaphor as a philosophical concept has a limit that has 
been recognized, in different ways, by France, Nietzsche, and Derrida. But what 
exactly is this marking, the trait of metaphor, and what is its significance? 
The trait in "Le retrait de la métaphore" has a strong connection with 
Heidegger. The notion of the Riss appears in Heidegger' s texts, and as Derrida 
adapts it, can be understood as that which constitutes the relation between words 
or concepts. Derrida interprets the notion of the Riss as trait: the Riss, Derrida 
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explains, is a tenn with great significance in Heidegger' s texts, and is discussed 
in tenns of voisinage and proxirnity - in the case discussed in "Le retrait de la 
métaphore", the relation between the concepts of Denken and Dichten, translated 
as thought and poetry. The French word 'trait' is defined as trace, marking, line, 
and characteristic; but the Gennan 'Riss' gives a slightly different emphasis, aIso 
signifying a tear, an incision, a gap, a schism. Linked with Riss, then, the retrait 
brings together the themes of marking, withdrawaI, and relation. It becomes 
clear that this relation of difference and proxirnity, marked by the Riss/trait, is 
nothing other than an inscription of difference. On the basis of Heidegger' s 
comments on the relation between thought and poetry, Derrida elaborates: 
... le trait avoisinant, disons le trait approchant, le trait propre qui rapporte (bezieht) l'une à 
l'autre Dichten ... et pensée (Denken) en leur proximité avoisinante, qui les partage et que 
les deux partagent, ce trait commun différentiel qui les attire réciproquement, tout en 
signant leur différence irréductible, ce trait, c'est le trait: Riss, tracement de frayage qui 
incise, déchire, marque l'écart, la limite, la marge, la marque ... 69 
The re-trait in the sense developed in this essay is a mark of a constitutive 
relation between concepts: the mark of the trait. This relation can be interpreted 
as one of proxirnity. Prima facie, the notion of proxirnity would suggest 
neamess; but proxirnity also requires distanciation (but "not separate, if separate 
69 Psyché, 87. 
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signifies 'to be distanced in the unrelated",7o). "Le retrait de la métaphore" 
works on the idea that the relation between concepts, their proximity and 
difference, has a fundamental bearing upon the propriety, the proper meaning, of 
each. This is obviously an extension of Saussure's idea of the role of difference 
in establishing identity, using the trait here to articulate a marking of relation. In 
the following passage, incision is another term that indicates this marking, and it 
too is closely linked with, if not indistinguishable from, the trait. The issue here 
is still the relation of the proximity of two concepts, Dichten and Denken: 
L'approchement est l' Ereignis qui renvoie Dichten et Denken dans le propre (in das Eigene) 
de leur essence (Wesen). Le trait de l'entame, donc, marque l'Ereignis comme propriation, 
événement de propriation. li ne précède pas les deux propres qu'il fait venir à leur propriété, 
car il n'est rien sans eux .... Dès lors qu'il se retire en se tirant, le trait est a priori retrait, 
inapparence, effacement de la marque de son entame.71 
The trait is another term for that which marks the structural relation of 
difference; and again, the crucial idea here, which follows from Saussure's 
disco very, is that the propriety of each is constituted through this marking of 
difference. The trait marks proximity and difference, and by doing so it situa tes 
each concept in its propriety. 
70 Ibid., 28. 
71 Ibid., 88. 
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Derrida's description of the retrait, while sometimes elliptical, playing 
on its multiple senses at once, has marked parallels with the notion of the trace. 
As Derrida de scribes in the passage above the trait "is a priori withdrawal, 
unappearance, and effacement of its mark in its incision". The trait does not 
refer to what is normally associated with a mark, which would have identity and 
presence; rather, it is the "effacement" of the mark, as it withdraws from being 
present. In this sense, the 're' of retrait indicates the same movement of 
withdrawal as does the trace. The mark and the trait are not present for 
essentially the same reason that was described by Saussure, in semiological 
terms: they are not existent things, insofar as the y articulate division and 
difference itself. It is the "between" of concepts, the relation of othemess 
through which each term is defined, which can only be described as marking, but 
which must not be mistaken for a present, unchanging entity. 
N'étant rien, [le trait] n'apparaît pas lui-même, il n'a aucune phénoménalité propre et 
indépendante, et ne se montrant pas, il se retire, il est structurellement en retrait, comme 
écart, ouverture, différentialité, trace, bordure, traction, effraction etc .... Son inscription, 
comme j'ai tenté de l'articuler de la trace ou de la différance, n'arrive qu'à s' effacer.72 
On top of the obvious lexical similarity, then, it is clear that the trait is similar to 
the trace in the context of différance insofar as the y both combine the senses of 
marking and withdrawal. Thus, as a form of the trace, the trait plays a double 
72 Psyché, 88-89. 
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role in language. In its necessity, it precludes any simple identity, any full 
presence. But, to interpret its function constructively, as one of creating 
possibility of meaning by marking difference, the trait establishes the propriety 
of a word, its "home", and its relation to others: 
Et se trait (Riss) est une coupe que se font, quelque part à l'infini, les deux voisins, Denken 
und Dichten. A l'entaille de cette coupe, ils s'ouvert, pourrait-on dire, l'un à l'autre, ils 
s'ouvrent de leur différence et même, pour me servir d'un mot dont j'ai ailleurs ... tenté de 
régler l'usage, se recoupent de leur trait et donc de leur retrait respectif.73 
The definition and the function of the trait clearly tie in with différance, 
and with the other themes that recur throughout Derrida's texts which are 
organized around it. It is the mark of relation; it is not present or singular; it is a 
condition of identity and propriety. But it remains to be more precisely 
determined how the trait, as it relates to the trace (and therefore to the other 
pivotaI "archi-concepts" that are used throughout his texts to "deconstruct" 
tradition aI philosophicaI themes), is a trait of metaphor, and what this would 
mean vis-à-vis différance. If metaphor has been exceeded, what is the 
significance of the marking of metaphor as trait, or of trait as metaphor? 
Derrida tells us that the trait is the trace of an incision, and therefore 
these figures, the trait, the trace, and the incision, are aIl interconnected in this 
discussion. They are components of a necessary connection of difference 
73 Psyché, 87. 
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between a pair of concepts - Dichten and Denken, from Heidegger' s discussion. 
This connection is essentially a drawing of each into the proximity of the other, 
in its difference. It is not inconsequential that in this case the trait of metaphor 
divides and marks thought and poetry: for the distinction between thought and 
poetry corresponds directly with the tradition al , philosophical structure of 
metaphor. The tension between metaphor as a poetic device, or an omament, 
and its uncertain role in presenting truth is based on the distinction of poetic 
language from philosophical language, the language which strives to be a pure 
conduit for truth. In "Le retrait de la metaphore", the fact that the distinction 
between Dichten and Denken is an essential division for the concept of metaphor, 
is a theme that remains almost a subtext; Derrida leaves the connection to be 
interpreted. But it is stated that the trait of metaphor, and the retrait of metaphor, 
are part of the relation between that particular pair of concepts, as distinct from 
each other. So if the trait, which is in sorne sense a trait of metaphor, is the 
condition for the appearance of the thoughtJpoetry distinction, then here again it 
is demonstrated that metaphor precedes propriety, even in terms of the very 
structure that would define metaphor. 
But furthermore, the trait, as trait of metaphor, operates between 
conceptual oppositions other than thought and poetry: "Si 'la' métaphysique 
avait une unité, ce serait le régime de ces oppositions qui n'apparaît et ne se 
détermine qu'à partir du retrait du trait, du retrait du retrait, etc.,,74 When 
Derrida states that the very system of oppositions that make up metaphysics 
74 Psyché, 89. 
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depends on the trait and on the retrait, this withdrawal could be considered as a 
retreat of the trait of metaphor, to a position of "primordiality" - a complicated 
primordiality of the kind shown in the trace, writing, and the mark. The trait 
would be the "origin" of the two (Dichten and Denken) "si un trait pouvait être 
quelque chose, pouvait être proprement et pleinement originaire.,,75 The trait 
and the trace are necessary for language and for the propriety of meaning; they 
are the preconditions for the unit y of the word, the name, the concept - or at 
least of the possibility of their unity. The trait of différance plays a role even 
more originary than the system of oppositions that constitutes metaphysics. The 
principle that started with Saussure applies just as forcefully here at this level: as 
a system of conceptual oppositions, metaphysics and its conceptual distinctions 
su ch as proper/literal, thought/poetry, signifier/signified, etc., are possible only 
insofar as they are constituted by differences within a system. Difference is the 
condition of their unit y, and of their appearance. Indeed, the oppositions of 
metaphysics rnight be the ex ample par excellence of the differential principle at 
work through the trait; for these concepts, existing as they do by virtue of a 
binary relation, most conspicuously have their identity constituted by the fact of 
their difference from their opposites. The binaries that make up metaphysics are 
the consummate case of the necessity of difference in establishing identity, for 
no one of its terms can be thought or produced without the inclusion of the 
difference of its other. In this case as weIl, what remains to be seen, what cannot 
be explained strictly on the basis of différance, is how metaphor plays into this 
75 Ibid., 87. 
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conceptual organization of philosophy. Through its withdrawal and expansion it 
has been shown that its effects occur everywhere; but retrait seems to be aiming 
at a specific account of tbis marking, a description of the formative role of a trait 
which is metaphorical. 
The function of the trait, then, seems be specifically in terms of propriety: 
the function of making proper meaning possible by inscribing the differences 
from other concepts within a given concept - or perhaps more accurately, 
between given concepts. But as shown earlier, the trait also seems to establish a 
limit or an impossibility as weIl - as do, for that matter, the other "archi-
concepts" that have been discussed. The withdrawal of metaphor, Derrida warns, 
"ne laisse pas la place libre à un discours du propre ou du littéral,,76; and in this 
way the effects of the withdrawal of metaphor, the retrait, are similar to the 
effects of the trace, the mark, and of différance generally, which make unit y 
possible and disrupt it. Which is to say that the account of their effects seems to 
be ambiguous, or paradoxical. If we look at his account in a broader focus, 
Derrida falls short of consistently, categorically maintaining that the "archi-
concepts" are the necessary conditions for language and meaning. Instead, he 
tends to waver in his emphasis, between characterizing their role in language as 
conditions of "possibility", and portraying them as limits, as necessities wbich 
interfere with any traditional determination of the aspects of language; or else he 
combines the two positions at once: the traditional determinations are both 
possible and impossible. After a section in which Derrida (still in the context of 
76 P:.yché, 80. 
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a discussion of Heidegger) discusses the trait as relation of inscription, as that 
which makes propriety possible ("sending" concepts "into the proper of their 
essence"), he cautions, referring to Heidegger: "Mais il faut, et c'est le plus 
énigmatique de ce cercle, revenir où nous sommes sans y être proprement".77 
Through the motifs of différance, it has been explained what propriety 
necessarily consists in - namely, difference via traces But while différance 
clearl y has a function of necessity, it seems that the propriety that depends upon 
it remains elusive. 
Here it seems advisable to consider further the seemingly, ambivalent 
gesture that is at work here; to do so 1 will circle back a bit. In terms of writing, 
Derrida has demonstrated the necessity of the shift from the notion of a "pure 
content" and discrete elements of sense, to an essential divergence of sense 
which is only composed, and decomposed, by traces. The fact that there are no 
"positive" values in language but only systemic differences, or traces of 
differences - in other words, text, in other words, writing - can be taken to 
mean that aIl aspects of the movement of language, including meaning, are 
reduced to plays of signifiers. The signifier is identified by the mark, writing, 
the trace, the trait; and aIl these are elements of exteriority, of marking and 
relation rather than of pure content. In light of this reduction, the semantic view 
of language, with its emphasis on the nominative word and the unit y of meaning, 
and the corresponding concepts of propriety and metaphor, now appears 
inadequate. 
77 Psyché, 85. 
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Discussing a specifie case of this inadequacy. Derrida writes: 
Le propre nom n'échappe pas à l'espacement, qu'il soit relié par son origine à des 
représentations de choses dans l'espace ou qu'il reste pris dans un système de différences 
phoniques ou de classification sociale apparemment délié de l'espace courant. La 
métaphore travaille le nom propre. Le sens propre n'existe pas, son "apparence" est une 
fonction nécessaire - et qu'il faut analyser comme telle - dans le système des différences et 
des métaphores.78 
Later, he writes of "la rature constituante du nom propre dans ce que nous avons 
appelé l'archi-écriture, c'est-à-dire dans le jeu de la différence.,,79 It is of 
interestto us here that the se passages suggest ways that metaphor, specifically, 
will be explained vis-à-vis trace, trait, and différance; but before following this 
connection, it is worth considering the emphasis that the se passages, and others 
like it, appear to give to the incompatibility of irreducible difference and the 
structures that depend on it. From Derrida's various descriptions, these forms of 
différance seem to have a curiously ambivalent force upon the conceptual 
structure that is rooted in metaphysics, the conceptual structure that defines 
language, proper meaning, and so on. For daims such as the se give further 
evidence that the various modes of différance produce effects of disruption at 
78 De la grammatologie, 136. 
79 Ibid., 159. 
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least as much as they create possibility in relation to linguistic concepts such as 
"proper meaning". 
s 
That metaphor "shapes and undermines the proper name" suggest a 
disruption of the proper name so drastic that its outcome is indeterminate. In 
light of the complexity of the analysis in "La mythologie blanche" and "Le 
retrait de la métaphore", such a strong, far-reaching statement about the role of 
metaphor in the previous citation, that proper meaning "does not exist" - might 
1 
seem somewhat incongruous. In fact, the generality of this statement seems to 
~be surprisingly close to Nietzsche's position in "On Truth and Falsity in a 
Nonmoral Sense". But is this position, taken from De la grammatologie, 
actually more radical than what "La mythologie blanche" or "Le retrait de la 
métaphore" suggests? Since De la grammatologie was written before "La 
mythologie blanche", and weIl before "Le retrait de la métaphore", a possible 
explanation is that at the time De la grammatologie was written, Derrida simply 
hadn't explored the question of metaphor at length, and that the two later essays 
are more accurate representations of his position on metaphor. However, little in 
either of these later texts really contradicts the claim in De la grammatologie; 
there are more passages in the se works that could be used to support the claim, 
and there are other relevant continuities between the texts (in terms of the trace, 
for example, which features largely in De la grammatologie, and its similarity to 
the trait in "Retrait") that it should be considered to apply to the analysis of 
metaphor here. 
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If proper meaning does not in fact "exist", as Derrida says, the question 
presents itself again: in what sense can metaphor "exist"? Derrida gives a 
possible answer to this in La dissémination, discussing the ambivalences in a 
text by Mallarmé: "Tout devenant métaphorique, il n'y a plus de sens propre et 
donc plus de métaphore."so For one, if proper meaning were obstructed, there 
would be no proper meaning for the word 'metaphor'. Moreover, wouldn't any 
definition of metaphor require a corresponding notion of literal, proper meaning, 
from which metaphor would be a divergence? Indeed, it has been stated and 
shown that the retrait of metaphor "ne laisse pas la place libre à un discourse du 
propre ou du littéral"; the circularity remains unavoidable. If the retrait of 
metaphor is ultimately paradoxical, this analysis should take care not to 
misrepresent that fact. In this respect, the following passage should also be 
considered. Derrida writes that his "final intention" in De la grammatologie is 
to "[r]endre énigmatique ce que l'on croit entendre sous les noms de proximité, 
d'immédiateté, de présence (le proche, le propre et le pré- de la présence)".81 
Does enigma figure in to the analysis of metaphor, and is there a point at which 
the hope of stabilizing either metaphor or proper meaning should be abandoned? 
Two immediate responses should be made to this. One is that the fact that the 
stated goal in De la grammatologie is to make these words enigmatic does not 
mean that they are not to be "reconstructed" in a different text. This could be 
explained with reference to Derrida's description of the two steps of the 
80 La dissémination, 290. 
81 De la grammatologie, 103. 
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deconstructive gesture; the deconstructive phase and the reinscription. 82 
Secondly, if Derrida's treatment of certain concepts is to render them enigmatic 
(recaII, for another example, the statement from the discussion of the trait and 
proximity, that "it is necessary (and this is what is most enigmatic about this 
~e 
circle) to come back to where we are without properly being there"), it maya 
1\ 
particular sense of enigma, or paradox, that is being invoked, one that does not 
necessarily reduce the concept to sheer mystery or meaninglessness. In light of 
the fact that Derrida's entire anaIysis of metaphor takes place within the 
recognized limits that the question of metaphor quickly cornes up against, it 
would seem that within these limits, within the apparent paradoxicaIity, there is 
much ground to be covered. 
Another response to this is that for Derrida, establishing the status of 
"non-existence" can often be construed as the affirrning of a possibility of a 
different deterrnination than that which the philosophicaI concept of "existence" 
would entail - namely, presence, totaIity, etc. In the rest of the passage that 
proc1aims that proper meaning does not exist, it is aIso stated that literaI, propre, 
meaning does in fact make an appearance, and that its appearance is a necessary 
function in the system of differences and metaphors. It is not at aIl c1ear that 
literaI, propre, meaning is abolished or negated in this movement. Its non-
./ 
/' 
"existence" does not reduce it to oblivion, as if it were something like a 
discredited concept (if such a thing could be imagined); something survives its 
disruption. It has been established that it is a matter of internaI division, 
82 See Gasché' s The Tain of the Mirror, pp. 163-76, for a discussion of these phases. 
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différance, which prevents proper meaning from existing whole, present, and 
autonomous. While bearing in mind the tension here, what must be determined 
further is the nature of this appearance and its relation to metaphor. 
The nature of literaI meaning, whether construed as possibility or 
impossibility, is to be understood in its relation to difference, and to metaphor. 
This has to do with an obscurity of literaI meaning and the fact that proper 
meaning cannot exist on its own, as such, without its being implicated in 
metaphor or metaphoricity. This would not seem to be as strong a position as 
the one stated in Of Grammatology (proper meaning does not exist, is a function 
of metaphors), but from a certain perspective they are not entirely inconsistent. 
This brings me to the main hypothesis of this analysis, which concems the sense 
of metaphor in Derrida's texts which exceeds the traditionaI concept of metaphor, 
the notion of metaphor that can be understood in spite of - or perhaps, due to -
the withdrawaI and generaIization that metaphor carries out (or that carries out 
metaphor). This hypothesis may not be particularly bold, for it seeks merely to 
interpret the theme that runs explicitly throughout Derrida's texts on metaphor; 
but aIthough it is not hidden, the de construction of metaphor and its outcome 
vis-à-vis proper meaning is multifaceted, complex, and structured in such a way 
that makes accounting for it difficult. 1 hope to contextuaIize this outcome of 
metaphor, which can no longer be thought to be strictly identicaI with the 
philosophicaI concept of metaphor. It is this other sense of metaphor, 1 believe, 
that is intended when Derrida writes, for example, that "[m]etaphor shapes and 
undermines the proper name". The appellation "metaphor" may in many cases, 
65 
through Derrida's analysis, come to be a way to de scribe how metaphor, after it 
has been deconstructed, or pu shed in its own logic to the point that it cornes 
apart ("self-destructs", withdraws and/or generalizes) - how metaphor remains 
through its generalization and its retreat, to be redefined or "reinscribed". This 
sense of metaphor is closely related to the trace of différance, at least insofar as 
the function it performs (re-trait) is related to the dividing and withdrawing 
movement of the trace that is found in Of Grammatology, Spurs, and other texts. 
"Le retrait de la métaphore" has indicated many correspondences between trait, 
trace, mark, etc.; and a further commonality between trait (as trait of metaphor) 
and différance in general seems to be this apparent ambivalence between 
possibility and impossibility vis-à-vis language and conceptual opposition. 
Différance and metaphor, through trait and traces, are involved in the same 
movement. 
Having arrived at this point, this analysis is better equipped to respond to 
the following question: In what way is the trait as it has been outlined, as a trait 
of relation that marks difference and proximity between concepts, a trait of 
metaphor? What relation does metaphor "as such" have with the trait, the 
relation of difference between words, concepts, meanings? The analysis of 
metaphor leads Derrida to the problem of the "between" of words, concepts, and 
meanings, so perhaps metaphor itself might come to be seen as a mode of 
differentiation, a mode of différance. In this case, what would be precisely the 
relation of metaphor to the trace and to writing? If metaphor is in fact an "archi-
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concept" that corresponds with the trace, the mark, etc., will it be possible to 
define it to the same ex te nt as these others have been defined by Derrida? 
Another passage will help to direct us from here: in "Le retrait" Derrida 
cites Heidegger, who says, "L'unité cherchée de l'essence de la Sprache, qu'elle 
s'appelle l'entame.,,83 It is somewhere between this position, which says that 
language is made possible through difference, and the position that renders 
metaphor and proper meaning enigmatic, that the correct understanding of 
metaphor, as a Derridean concept, is situated. 
7) Différance, detour, and metaphor 
If metaphor is to be understood in relation to différance, a relation that 
the trait has indicated, it must also be thought in terms of its antagonistic relation 
to what Derrida calls "philosophy's unique thesis": that the sense aimed at 
through its metaphors 
est une essence rigoureusement indépendante de ce qui la transporte, ce qui est un thèse, 
déjà, philosophique, on pourrait même dire l'unique thèse de la philosophie, celle qui 
constitue le concept de métaphore, l'opposition du propre et du non-propre, de l'essence et 
de l'accident, de l'intuition et du discours, de la pensée et du langage, de l'intelligible et du 
83 Psyché, 89-90. 
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·bl 84 sens] e, etc. 
Through différance, it is revealed "against the tradition" that sense is not, in fact, 
an independent essence which is autonomous from the signifier; that this notion 
of the "pure signified" is unsustainable; and that signified, meaning, and idea are 
already in the position of textual difference. AIl of the se effects of différance, 
and others as weIl, would create their own displacement of the traditional 
concept of metaphor, as ide from metaphor's deconstruction on its own basis, 
which has been explored thus far. But while Aristotle's definition does not 
manage to entirely keep its hold on metaphor, metaphor or something like it 
nonetheless retums, and re-marks, unavoidably. But what is this marking that 
precedes even the concepts of metaphoricity and propriety? If the trait marking 
the relation and proximity between concepts, such as Dichten and Denken, is to 
be called metaphorical, th en what is the "affiliation" between the sense of 
metaphor as trait, and the traditional, philosophical concept of metaphor, with 
which metaphoricity presumably has sorne relationship? Now, recalling that in 
Aristotle's determination of metaphor it was found that metaphor creates 
something like a detour away from the direct passage between words, meaning 
and truth; perhaps this movement of detour that would have taken place vis-à-vis 
~ 
the c1assical definition of metaphor (if the c1assical definition not already 
unstable) might help to account for the relationship which remains to be 
explained between metaphor and the trait/trace. 1 will reprint here a passage 
84 Marges, 273. 
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cited earlier, which IlÙght be particularly helpful in illuIlÙnating a sense in which 
metaphor and the trace operate along the same lines with respect to the role they 
play in language: 
Le jeu des différences suppose en effet des SynthètL. des renvois qui interdisent qu'à 
aucun moment, en aucun sens, un élément simple soit présent en lui-même et ne renvoie 
qu'à lui-même. Que ce soit dans l'ordre du discours parlé ou du discours écrit, aucun 
élément ne peut fonctionner comme signe sans renvoyer à un autre élément qui lui-même 
n'est pas simplement présent. Cet enchaînement fait que chaque "élément" - phonème ou 
graphème - se constitue à partir de la trace en lui des autres éléments de la chaîne ou du 
système. Cet enchaînement, ce tissue, est le texte qui ne se produit que dans la 
transformation d'un autre texte ... Il n'y a, de part en part, que des différences et des traces de 
traces.85 
Through the description here of the syntheses and referrals that constitute any 
element of language, the link between the philosophical concept of metaphor and 
the deconstructed sense of metaphor as an originary differing and deferral 
through the trait IlÙght be unexpectedly straightforward. If the trace is that 
relation by which differences, syntheses and referrals constitute any given part, 
then the unit y of meaning al ways passes through difference, through syntheses 
and referrals (of still other syntheses and referrals). This movement is a deferral 
and diversion of identity; in other words, a detour - like metaphor. 
85 Positions, 37-38. 
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The key to Derrida's notion of metaphoricity (although the shift in terms 
is not specified, Derrida seems to use the word 'metaphoricity' to be 
distinguished from the limited philosophical concept of metaphor), may be in 
terms of this movement of diversion and deferral, as a principle of detour. The 
detour implied by the classical concept of metaphor was indicated in the 
following passage, cited previously: "Marking the moment of the tum or of the 
detour [du tour ou du détour] during which meaning might seem to venture forth 
alone, unloosed from the very thing it aims a[tiowever, from the truth which 
" attunes it to its referent, metaphor also opens the wandering of the semantic."S6 
Now considering the case of the sense of metaphor that exceeds this 
philosophical concept to mark language, with a trait, from a pre-originary 
position: in its evasion and its withdraw al , in combination with its necessary 
marking of every concept, the trait of metaphor that precedes language has as its 
necessity the effect of a detour. This would be a detour by way of traces; of 
meaning by way of other meanings, and to put it most broadly, of identity by 
way of difference. The propriety of a concept is constituted by "syntheses and 
referrals", incisions of the trait which mark proximity and distance. Therefore, 
the propriety of a concept is constituted by way of other concepts, by way of a 
detour of difference. But, unlike most detours, this one does not result in the 
promised goal, a full presence of meaning that says the thing in itself, or pure, 
originary propriety. It would be a detour which escapes the teleology of 
meaning, because instead of fulfilling a promise of full presence and truth, it 
86 Margins of Philosophy, 241. 
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instead renders it unattainable - or at least, renders it unattainable without that 
which disrupts it and div ides it: namely, the trace of difference - or, perhaps, 
without metaphor. In one sense, it would be a de tour without end; a divergence 
that does not converge, or at least not in the tradition al sense in which the end 
would be "onto-theological", where the convergence would be a pure unit y of _ 
meaning, an ideality that would have to have existed already, independent of the 
signification, independent of the play of signifiers and marks that constitutej it. 
Metaphor as basis for language would be "[l]a pratique de la langue ou du code 
supposant un jeu de formes, sans substance déterminée et invariable". 87 Perhaps, 
in short, if metaphoricity is understood as de tour, the detour must be thought not 
as a means to an end, but as the end itself. 
Metaphor, in any aspect of its generalizations (retreat, re-trait), maintains 
the effect of divergence from the essential propriety of meaning that was a 
possibility of the concept of metaphor articulated by Aristotle. If linguistic and 
conceptual difference is produced metaphorically, it would be with an emphasis 
on (the French) 'transport', the de tour, through correspondences, as was 
described in the correspondence, in terms of difference, between the concepts of 
thought and poetry. The propriety of each passes by way of the other, by way of 
its difference from its other; these differences are inscribed on each of them. 
The detour of metaphor, then, would be away from proper meaning and into "un 
jeu de formes" without a fundamental semantic substance, guaranteed by logos, 
limiting the play of traces. The movement of the "wandering of the semantic" as 
87 Marges, 16. 
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part of the movement of metaphor in its tradition al concept, is repeated here in 
metaphoricity, although the structure has changed. But while the detour may be 
an apt tenu to describe difference as the deferral and divergence from presence, 
would this movement of deferral and divergence be properly described as 
metaphorical ? 
Let us follow this possibility further. As has been described, meaning, as 
it is constituted by traces of difference, entails a deferral of meaning. One 
articulation of this deferral is as an interval, based on the fact of repetition and 
iteration. This interval is the space of an interior doubling: "l'espacement était 
l'impossibilité pour une identité de se fenuer sur elle-même, sur le dedans de sa 
propre intériorité ou sur sa coïncidence avec SOl. L'irréductibilité de 
l'espacement, c'est l'irréductibilité de l'autre.,,88 Meaning IS always at an 
interval, deferred, from other meanings and also from itself; its self-identity is 
constituted by othemess, and it remains at a remove from its own completion in 
presence. An "element" must be other than itself so it can be the same - a notion 
which combines identity and difference. There is another detour here, then, an 
"interior" detour away from proper meaning into a relation of othemess that an 
element has with itself; and it is as an effect of this detour that the identity of the 
element is constituted, and re-constituted. But this establishing of identity is not 
the replenishing of pure, unitary sense: the detour produces something like this 
unit y as an effect - which, as an effect, is structurally different than the 
traditional notion of meaning, which originates in logos as truth. 
88 Positions, 130. 
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Metaphoricity, then, bears not only upon the relations between separate 
things, constituted and identified by their differential relations which situate each 
back in its propriety. It is indieated as weIl in the necessity of difference and 
deferral shown by the fact of repetition and iteration that metaphoricity is 
operative "within" the things that do appear, within the individualities that are 
constituted metaphorically, by way of a detour. Identity is based in difference 
not only from the rest of the elements of a system in which an identity is founded, 
but also on the basis of the element's difference from itself; its repetition or 
persistence, its appearance generally, requires that it appear and reappear, always 
other and the same, with a space that is a part of its identity, an interval of 
difference that makes room for its appearance of unity. The trait of relation and 
difference is operative within the very thing in relation to itself, and in its 
difference from itself. The detour of difference, then, the metaphorical detour 
away from wholeness and presence, and propriety, is at work within and in 
relation to any "single" constituent. 
A passage from Of Grammatology highlights this link between 
metaphoricity and différance in terms of the doubling that precedes appearance. 
In this passage Derrida discusses the topie of allegory and painting as it 
corresponds with writing; but its concem coincides with our analysis here. He 
appraises, critically, the notion that there could be "la représentation pure, sans 
déplacement métaphorique": 
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Le projet de répéter la chose ... comporte donc une métaphoricité, une translation 
élémentaire. On transporte la chose dans son double (c'est-à-dire déja dans une idéalité) 
pour un autre et la représentation parfaite est toujours déjà autre que ce qu'elle double et re-
présente ... La duplication de la chose ... déjà dans l'éclat du phénomène où elle est présente, 
gardée et regardée, maintenue si peu que ce soit en regard et sous le regard, ouvre 
l'apparaître comme absence de la chose à son propre et à sa vérité."s9 
Any appearance stands on the condition of a metaphoric movement, a doubling, 
a detour of non-singularity or non-presence. "On transporte [recall epiphora, the 
"transport" in Aristotle's definition of metaphor] la chose dans son double"; 
there is not only, then, a metaphorical relation of difference between different 
things, but there is also a metaphorical transference that constitutes the thing 
itself, solely on its own basis (in the now qualified sense of these terms), in its 
difference from itself (a self which, to be sure, is in another sense possible on the 
basis of differences from others); this difference makes possible its appearance, 
its reappearance, and its repetition. And interestingly, this passage seems to 
suggest that mimesis and homoiosis do in fact play a role in metaphoricity as 
such. The metaphorical doubling in this discussion is in the context of artistic 
representation, and this seems to imply that there is still à relation of 
resemblance that is or can be involved in the transport of metaphoricity. But if 
this were the case, it would be a sense of mimesis and homoiosis without an 
essence, without a proper term - the notionCt mime sis and homoiosis would 
89 De la grammatologie, 412. 
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have to be "reinscribed" to account for them differently. This suggests an 
inquiry that would have to take place elsewhere; the main idea here is thasagain, 
there takes place a primary detour away from propriety. 
Another ex ample that can be considered here is the discussion of the sun 
and its relation to metaphor in "La mythologie blanche". 'The sun' is the perfect 
embodiment of the proper name, being a single referent, "unique, irremplaçable, 
naturel, autour duquel tout doit tourner, vers lequel tout doit tourner.,,90 It is also 
the paradigm of the sensory - as Leonard Lawlor writes, "[p]hilosophical 
discourse is constituted by terms and oppositions ... such as phainesthai, aletheia, 
etc., oppositions such as the visible and the invisible, appearing and disappearing, 
presence and absence. AlI the se basic terms~d opposition~ve from the 
sun, its light and movement,,91 But the sun itself is only improperly known; it 
displaces its sensory self, turns and bides, furnishing only improper sensible 
knowledge. And at another level, the whole, total presence of the sun (which, 
rigorously defined, would be an intemporal or absolute existence) is displaced by 
its doubling itself in its disappearing, reappearing and changing, by existing and 
subsisting, always other and the same. In Lawlor's words, the sun, and therefore 
nature in general, "is a sort of trace (gramma). The turning and hiding of the sun 
implies that the sensory thing is always differentiating itself as and in the now, 
dividing and duplicating itself as other than itself.,,92 On the one hand, the sun, 
Derrida tells us, "est inscrit dans un système de relations qui le constitue. Ce 
90 Marges, 300. 
91 Imagination and Chance, 22. 
92 Ibid., 22. 
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nom n'est plus le nom propre d'une chose unique auquel la métaphore 
surviendrait; il a déjà commencé à dire l'origine multiple, divisée, de toute 
semence, l'oeil, l'invisibilité, la mort, le père, le 'nom propre', etc." This is 
obviously a dense passage which bears on the crux of our investigation, and one 
that also caBs for an extensive reading into the relation of metaphor and the sun, 
and its connection to truth, logos, and philosophy. But in terms of the focus of 
our analysis at this point, it explains the metaphoricity of proper names, insofar 
as their determinations are based around the "system of relations that 
constitutes" them. But then, again, the relation to others, to other relations, is 
furthermore doubled within the thing, the unit y that is named: 
le soleil proprement dit, le soleil sensible, ne fournit pas seulement de mauvaises 
connaissances parce que de mauvaises métaphores, il est seulement métaphorique. 
Puisqu'on ne peut plus s'assurer, nous dit Aristote, de ses charactères sensibles comme de 
ses "propres", le soleil n'est jamais proprement présent dans le discours .... Le plus naturel 
de la nature comporte en lui-même de quoi sortir de soi; il compose avec la lumière 
'artificiel', s'eclipse, s'ellipse, a toujours été autre, lui-même .. .',93 
If any name, even that of the sun (whose "metaphorical" role is so essential in 
philosophy, "donnant de surcroît la mesure des bonnes et des mauvais 
métaphores, des claires et des obscures; puis, à la limite, de ce qui est pire ou 
93 Marges, 300. 
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meilleur que la métaphore,,94), is itself "solely metaphorical", then the trait of 
metaphor is at work within every name; the movement of metaphoricity is 
inscribed within each term simply by the fact of its appearance; for its 
appearance alone belies its full, proper presence, which would be an absolute, 
intemporal existence. 
8) Conclusion 
Metaphor leads to this web of problems that, within the context of 
philosophy, is to sorne extent paradoxical, and cannot, in the context of 
traditional philosophy at least, be clearly resolved. But if the generalized sense 
of metaphoricity, in its complexity, can be reduced to a single principle, it would 
be the absence of the proper. Metaphor, having been found to have an effect at 
the levels of the conceptual articulation of philosophy and metaphysics, cannot 
be determined narrowly; its reach precedes that which would circumscribe it in 
such a way. Its determination would be in terms of withdrawing: its own 
withdrawing, and that of the proper. The problem of metaphoricity, then, in this 
way leads to the same level of originality as différance, which precedes all 
language, and all conceptual distinctions, as the condition for the appearance of 
these. But metaphoricity at this level is both more specifie than différance, and 
less clear. In one sense, metaphor supplements différance with a powerful 
94 Ibid., 300. 
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articulation of différance in terms of the absence of propriety. For the concepts 
of proper and metaphor would be established at the level of distinction that 
precedes the conceptual bifurcations that circumscribe them, the level at which it 
is the difference between concepts that is the constitutive quality. Metaphor and 
proper, then, in their originary definitions, can only be defined in their 
opposition to each other. But in this case there is no proper or metaphorical 
"ground" on which these terms originate. The possibility, and impossibility, of 
each one is inscribed in the other. And this is the detour, the inscriptive 
movement of metaphor, that withdraws, and cannot be fixed or stabilized. The 
concept and metaphor take on a complex and endless dynamism of which "Le 
retrait de la métaphore" begins an elaboration that could have no end, which 
could never find a fixed reference point on which to establish metaphorical and 
proper. In their articulation through the differential trait, metaphor and proper 
are defined by the relation between them, which is neither metaphoric nor proper. 
"La mythologie blanche" in fact anticipates this outcome: "Et par conséquent de 
faire sauter l'opposition rassurante du métaphorique et du propre dans laquelle 
l'un et l'autre ne faisaient jamais que se réfléchir et se renvoyer leur 
rayonnement. ,,95 
But it is the question of metaphor more than other concepts, reaching its 
first lirnits quickly through the semantic view of language, that becomes the key 
to the very formation of this terrain, of the structure of traits that defines both 
proper and metaphorical. Metaphor is required to establish the proper, and vice 
95 Marges, 323. 
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versa: metaphor makes its detour through propriety, and propriety through 
metaphor. But in the case of "proper" and "metaphor", the mirroring is uniquely 
endless, for the so-called propriety of meaning is that which organizes the 
discourse itself. A ceaseless divergence results, then, of one through the other, 
by way of the trait - which, as division, vanishes. This is what the trait 
represents, quasi-metaphorically. But this movement too must withdraw, so that 
metaphor and propriety can be articulated as such, insofar as they are possible: 
but whatever the "as such" is, it is always based on a prior entanglement, a prior 
complicity, a prior division. 
Metaphoricity takes a certain priority 10 the relation of proper and 
metaphorical; for both proper and metaphor become, although paradoxically, 
more metaphorical than proper. In all instances of their relationship, the proper 
is underrnined; metaphor is the norm, for as a detour it captures at least the 
process, the diversion through difference. 
But there is a sense in which the entanglement of metaphor and the 
concept, of metaphor and proper meaning, is really not resolved one way or the 
other. The proper, it has been shown, meets its impossibility in metaphor; and 
metaphor's impossibility is tied up with all aspects of language. At the limits of 
language, there is no metaphorical, nor proper: the opposition depends upon the 
between of the two, their system of exchanges, the trait of their relation. Any 
name, the name of 'proper' or 'metaphor' as weIl, is always already caught up in 
the system of relations that constitutes it. And the lines that separate them are 
neither metaphoric nor non-metaphoric; neither proper nor improper. But there 
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is a sense in which metaphoricity, understood as irreducible relation and lack of 
a proper, is better suited to describe the production of language, of meaning and 
a.,... 
of difference, t1m propriety; as 1 have described in terms of the detour, propriety 
is an effect of difference, and therefore can be said to be an effect of 
metaphoricity. Metaphor extends beyond the bounds of philosophy, and it 
cannot be contained. The withdrawal of the proper is metaphorical: and the 
withdrawal of the metaphorical is what makes the proper appear: but only 
insofar as the latter is already divided against its other. 
Thus when Derrida makes the gesture of associating the trait of 
différance with metaphor, it is in part due to a fortunate agreement between the 
movement of metaphor and différance, and in part because metaphoricity 
disrupts the proper at a fundamental level. The detour 1 have described as 
originary metaphoricity, can in fact be construed as a metaphor of metaphor. 
Metaphor leads to différance, but at that level, its proper meaning being a matter 
of difference, it is no longer metaphor in any distinct manner. And différance 
can be described in other ways than metaphoricity. But metaphor, in the 
broadest sense, as the movement through the other, the detour, brings a range of 
possibilities for filling out différance in ways that other terms writing, the trace, 
et al. do not capture as sharply. The problem of metaphor leads sharply to the 
fact of the limits of propriety for the concepts of philosophy, showing how, at 
sorne level, they meet up and intertwine with metaphor, rooted in the difference 
between them that cannot be addressed as either proper or improper; metaphor, 
most broadly understood, marks the inclusive distinction between things, thereby 
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establishing their propriety. But this mark, in tum, withdraws, allowing the 
"present" to come forward, to be identified as proper, as an effect of metaphor. 
In my own view, the persistent tension between possibility and 
impossibility that has risen repeatedly in this analysis finds no easy answer; it 
connects with the broader question of how to reconcile the account of language 
based on différance with the tradition al structures of language such as concept, 
proper meaning, origins, and so on - a difficult question which bears upon the 
reception of Derrida's work continuously, and which, despite the successes of 
deconstruction and différance, continues to cause it to be relegated, to sorne 
extent, to the margins of philosophy. The reduction to metaphoricity that is seen 
in "La mythologie blanche" and "Le retrait de la métaphore" does not pro vide a 
simple, stable basis for the derivation of proper meaning and metaphor; ev en in 
comparison with other articulations of différance, the effects of différance 
through metaphor are more dynamic, perhaps more radical, and the challenge of 
reconciling metaphor with univocity and proper meaning has not been fuIly 
resolved. What would seem to be the most obvious response, and one that this 
essay has invoked, which is that différance, or more specifically metaphoricity, 
brings about proper meaning as an effect of metaphor, has a definite plausibility, 
and finds corroboration in Derrida's texts; but there is certainly room for this 
connection to be elucidated, and worked out further. This is not to say that the 
credibility or validity of différance hinges on this explanation, for Derrida - as 
weIl as his precursors in Heidegger, Nietzsche, Freud - has shown that the 
irreducibility of difference is no illusion. If there is "illusion" at work, it would 
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seern to lie on the other side of language, on the rnetaphysical distinctions that 
always, at sorne level, require rnetaphoricity to appear. 
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